Doctor of Philosophy by Matthews, Lucas John
 1 
















A dissertation submitted to the faculty of 
The University of Utah 














Department of Philosophy  
 

























Copyright © Lucas John Matthews 2016 
 
All Rights Reserved 
 3 








The dissertation of Lucas John Matthews 
has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: 
 
James Tabery , Chair 6/7/2016 
 
Date Approved 
Matthew Haber , Member 6/7/2016 
 
Date Approved 
Stephen Downes , Member 6/7/2016 
 
Date Approved 
Jon Seger , Member 6/7/2016 
 
Date Approved 




and by Matthew Haber , Chair/Dean of  
the Department/College/School of Philosophy 
 







The ‘New Philosophy of Mechanisms’ has been developed in light of 
dissatisfaction with previous philosophical models of scientific explanation. It comprises 
a variety of different views regarding the nature of mechanistic explanation, mechanistic 
strategies of investigation, as well as a mechanistic theory of causation.  This dissertation 
addresses two basic questions regarding this new philosophy of mechanisms. First, what 
exactly is it? Second, what is its scope? In response to the first question I argue that while 
the new mechanists are informed by a variety of different cases, defend a variety of 
different theses, and are motivated by a variety of different problems, all share an 
emphasis on the value of mechanistic reasoning to scientific understanding. In response 
to the second question, I argue that the new philosophy of mechanisms extends to 
integrate with statistical reasoning in modern evolutionary biology. The upshot is a better 
picture of the nature, limit, and scope of the most recent and promising philosophical 












1 INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………...1 
 
 1.1 On Mechanistic Reasoning in Evolutionary Biology ………………………...1 
1.2 Summary and Explanation of Chapters ………………………………………4 
1.3 References ……………………………………………………...……………..8 
 
2 ON PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: FROM NOMOLOGICAL 
DEDUCTIONS TO MECHANISM ELUCIDATION …………………………………...9 
 
 2.1 Abstract………………………………………………………………………..9 
2.2 Introduction …………………………………………………………………...9 
 2.3 Models of Scientific Explanation and Their Pitfalls ………………………...10 
 2.4 The New Philosophy of Mechanisms ……………………………………….17 
 2.5 On Solidarity and Scope …………………………………………………….24 
 2.6 References …………………………………………………………………...26 
 
3 MECHANISMS: METAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY, METHODOLOGY, AND 
DEFINITIONS …………………………………………………………………………..30 
 
 3.1 Preface…….………………………………………………………………….30 
 3.2 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..32 
 3.3 Three Proposals for What Is at Stake………………………………………...33 
 3.4 An Alternate Proposal for What Is at Stake………………………………….36 
 3.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...38 
 
4 MECHANISTIC REASONING IN STATISTICAL PHYLOGENETICS …………...40 
 
 4.1 Preface…….………………………………………………………………….40 
 4.2 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..41 
 4.3 From Molecular Mechanisms to Maximum Likelihood……………………..42 
 4.4 Embedded Phylogenetic Mechanisms……………………………………….46 
 4.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...49 
 6 
 
5 MECHANISTIC REASONING IN POPULATION GENETICS …………………....52 
 
 5.1 Preface………………………………………………………………………..52 
5.2 Introduction ………………………………………………………………….52 
 5.3 Population Genetics as a Nonmechanistic Methodology …………………...54 
5.4 Mechanistic Methods and Mechanism Elucidation in Compositional  
Biology...…………………………………………………………………………55 
 5.5 On the Integration of Population Genetic and Mechanistic Methods………..57 
 5.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...62 







LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figures 
3.1 Modified MONIAC from Matthewson and Calcott (2011)……...…………………..34 
3.2 Toy sieve mechanism of natural selection……………………...……………………35  







1.1 On Mechanistic Reasoning in Evolutionary Biology 
 I tackle two basic questions regarding a recent and promising philosophy of 
science: the so-called ‘new philosophy of mechanisms’. First, what exactly is the new 
philosophy of mechanisms? Because the new philosophy of mechanisms has emerged 
primarily in response to dissatisfaction with previous efforts to characterize scientific 
explanation, it is often treated as providing a philosophical account of scientific 
explanation. A closer look, however, reveals that the new philosophy of mechanisms 
involves much more than a view about explanation. In addition to views about 
explanation, new mechanists defend views regarding scientific discovery, methodology, 
understanding, as well as the metaphysics of causation (Craver & Tabery, 2015). For 
these reasons, there has been some difficulty in assessing the core commitments of the 
new philosophy of mechanisms. Therefore, identifying a philosophical thesis that 
underpins the philosophy of mechanisms is the first major goal of this dissertation.  
Second, what is the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms? Much of what 
has been said about the role and value of mechanistic thinking has been grounded in 
specific sciences, such as molecular biology and neuroscience. It remains an ongoing 
effort of the new mechanists to assess the limits and scope of the mechanistic account 
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across the sciences. Moreover, there appear to be domains of scientific practice that are 
nonmechanistic. Sciences that focus on population-level patterns, driven by statistical 
methods and making no explicit appeal to mechanisms or mechanistic information (e.g., 
parts, activities, or organization), are sciences that present challenge cases for the new 
philosophy of mechanisms. Therefore, the second major task of this dissertation is to 
assess the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms, especially as it pertains to those 
seemingly nonmechanistic domains of investigation. 
 The first thesis of this dissertation provides an answer to the first question: what is 
the new philosophy of mechanisms? I argue that the glue that binds the new philosophers 
of mechanism is an emphasis on the importance of mechanistic reasoning to 
understanding the world. While some new mechanists defend views about mechanistic 
explanation, others defend views about mechanistic methodology or causality. What is 
common to each, however, is that their views are driven by mechanistic reasoning – i.e., 
a tendency to conceive of the natural world as composed of causally interacting and 
organized parts or components. I make my case for this thesis in Chapter 3, where I offer 
an exhaustive analysis of all the philosophical theses associated with the new philosophy 
of mechanisms. While various new mechanists defend different views about explanation, 
methodology, and causality, they are all grounded by mechanistic reasoning.  
 The second thesis of this dissertation works to answer the second major question: 
what is the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms? To that end, I argue that the new 
philosophy of mechanisms, evidenced by mechanistic reasoning, extends to integrate 
with, but not overlap or supersede, inherently nonmechanistic, statistical reasoning in 
modern evolutionary biology. Unlike mechanistic reasoning, statistical reasoning drives 
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efforts to mathematically model, evaluate, and predict large-scale (e.g., population-level) 
patterns. I make my case for this claim in two parts. First, in Chapter 4, I make a case for 
the role and value of mechanistic reasoning in statistical phylogenetics, which is a 
historically nonmechanistic subfield of evolutionary biology. There I argue that 
mechanistic reasoning positively influences tree hypothesis construction via use of 
‘embedded mechanisms’ in Maximum Likelihood models of inference. Second, in 
Chapter 5, I make a case for the role and value of mechanistic reasoning in population 
genetics. There I argue that the modern application of classical population-genetic, 
statistical methods is integrated with a family of mechanistic methods used to investigate 
and understand the relationships between genotypes, phenotypes, and fitness.  
 With these two positive theses in mind, a few clarifications are in order. The first 
clarification is to highlight that, although the new philosophy of mechanisms is closely 
associated with philosophical accounts of scientific explanation, my contributions more 
closely regards scientific reasoning. This is because although the new mechanists are 
motivated by problems facing previous accounts of explanation, the only viable way to 
tether all of their views is by focusing on reasoning. Moreover, my contribution does not 
attempt to capture scientific reasoning across the board, but specifically mechanistic 
reasoning – i.e., reasoning about the world as composed of causally-interacting and 
organized parts. Furthermore, I do not attempt to assess the scope of mechanistic 
reasoning across all the science. Rather, I target only those specific fields where 
mechanistic reasoning is both historically and conceptually unexpected; namely, 
statistical phylogenetics and population genetics. I invite readers to assess whether or not 
my conclusions extrapolate to a broader domain of scientific practice. For these reasons, 
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the force of this project regards specifically the role of mechanistic reasoning in 
evolutionary biology.  
 
1.2 Summary and Explanation of Chapters 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: A Review of Background Literature 
A large part of the motivation for this dissertation project comes from a rich 
history of philosophical efforts to characterize scientific explanation and problems for 
each account. Chapter 2 helps make clear this rich history by describing six major 
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation: (1) the Deductive Nomological Model, 
(2) the Deductive Statistical Model, (3) the Inductive Statistical Model, (4) the 
Unification Model, (5) the Statistical Relevance Model, and (6) the Causal-Mechanical 
Model. Each model provides a highly specified thesis regarding the nature of scientific 
explanation and each thesis exhibits counterexamples in scientific practice. Chapter 2 
also introduces the new philosophy of mechanisms as a conglomeration of philosophies 
of science designed to resolve many of the issues that beset the six previous models.  
 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: What Is the New Philosophy of Mechanisms? 
 The goal of Chapter 3 is to make a case for mechanistic reasoning as the glue that 
binds the variety of different views and theses associated with the new philosophy of 
mechanisms. It does so by engaging an extant account: Arnon Levy’s (2013) tripartite 
model of the new philosophy of mechanisms. Levy construes the philosophy of 
mechanisms as comprised of three different groups of claims regarding (1) mechanistic 
explanation, (2) mechanistic methods, and (3) mechanistic causality. I apply Levy’s 
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model to a recent debate regarding whether or not natural selection ‘is a mechanism’ to 
reveal additional projects and normative challenges that underpin the philosophy of 
mechanisms.   
First, there is the project of fleshing out and articulating mechanistic explanation, 
as a set of philosophical theses regarding the manner in which scientists appeal to 
mechanisms or mechanistic information (e.g., parts, activities, and organization) in their 
efforts to explain various natural phenomena. Second, there is the project of fleshing out 
and articulating mechanistic methods, as strategies of investigation in modern scientific 
practice. Unlike these first two major constituents of the new philosophy of mechanisms, 
the third project, mechanistic causality, regards the metaphysics of causation. The 
additional project that underpins each of these three primary objectives of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms is definitional mechanism, the fundamental task of articulating 
exactly what a ‘mechanism’ is in the first place.  
 Chapter 3 also addresses the challenge of application, which is the challenge of 
aligning one’s definition of mechanism with the manner in which the term is actually 
used by practicing scientists. In this respect, Chapter 3 introduces a normative component 
of the new philosophy of mechanisms, as some (but not all) new mechanists have 
positive views about how practicing scientists should think and talk about mechanisms. 
The key take-home, however, is that Chapter 3 should be read as answering the question: 
what is the new philosophy of mechanisms? On the one hand, it makes clear how the new 
philosophy of mechanisms comprises a variety of projects involving mechanistic 
explanation, mechanistic methods, and mechanistic causality. In addition to those 
projects is the more fundamental task of defining what a mechanism is in the first place. 
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What is common to the three major projects, however, is an emphasis on the importance 
of mechanistic reasoning to understanding the world.  
 Chapter 3 makes ample use of a locution that calls for some clarification. 
Throughout the chapter, I make my case in light of the question: “what philosophical 
theses associated with the new philosophy of mechanisms are at stake in light of the 
debate about natural selection as a mechanism?” I have adopted this ‘at stake’ language 
in this chapter because there I use Levy as a foil, who is the first to use this particular 
terminology. If a philosophical thesis is ‘at stake’ in light of the debate about natural 
selection as a mechanism, it means that that particular philosophical thesis must either be 
brought into question or completely rejected as a consequence of the conclusion that 
natural selection is not in fact a mechanism. So, for example, the philosophical thesis that 
all causal phenomena are mechanisms is ‘at stake’ in light of the debate about natural 
selection as a mechanism because, if it turns out that natural selection (which is a causal 
process) is not a mechanism, then it cannot be true that all causal phenomena are 
mechanisms. In short, readers should note that Chapter 5 treats a philosophical thesis as 
‘at stake’ if that thesis must be rejected or brought under scrutiny as a consequence of 
how one settles the debate regarding whether or not natural selection is a mechanism.  
 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Mechanistic Reasoning in Statistical Phylogenetics 
 The thesis of this chapter is that there are instances of statistical phylogenetics (an 
exemplary nonmechanistic science) that benefit from mechanistic reasoning. Thus, this 
chapter should be read as providing an argument that seeks to assess the scope of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms, which is the second major task of this dissertation. In this 
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respect, the thesis is that mechanistic reasoning extends to integrate with statistical 
phylogenetics, via the practice of embedding mechanisms in the mathematical models 
used to construct phylogenetic tree hypotheses.   
 
1.2.4 Chapter 5: Mechanistic Reasoning in Population Genetics 
Like Chapter 4, Chapter 5 works to answer the question: what is the scope of the 
new philosophy of mechanisms? It does so by addressing the role and value of 
mechanistic reasoning in population genetics, another exemplar of nonmechanistic 
science. While classical population genetics is indeed an inherently nonmechanistic 
approach to the investigation and explanation of evolutionary hypotheses, the modern 
application of population genetic methods is deeply integrated with a contrasting class of 
mechanistic methods in evolutionary biology. By integrated, I mean that mechanistic and 
population genetic methods are combined in current efforts by practicing evolutionary 
biologists to investigate, explain, and build evidence for hypotheses regarding adaptive 
evolution. That is, while there was a time when biologists were divided on how best to 
investigate and build evidence for claims about evolution – population-genetic, statistical 
vs. organism-oriented, causal-mechanical approaches – today rather large families of 
mechanistic and statistical methods are applied either in tandem or sequentially in efforts 
to investigate, explain, and build evidence for claims regarding adaptive evolution in 
natural populations.  
It is important to note that although Chapter 5 is framed as addressing the role of 
mechanistic reasoning in the field of population genetics, the cases that are considered 
represent instances in which population genetic methods are applied in modern biology. 
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The reason for this is that, at the bottom line, what is pertinent to my philosophy of 
science is not the theoretical and conceptual framework of population genetics, but rather, 
the manner in which practicing scientists use population genetic methods in modern 
evolutionary biology. To that end, applied population genetics in modern evolutionary 
biology, rather than the theoretical foundations of population genetics, is the focus of 
Chapter 5.  
 
1.2.5 Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 Chapter 6 restates the two major goals tackled by this dissertation. On the one 
hand, it asks the question: what is the new philosophy of mechanisms? It answers that 
common to all projects in the new philosophy of mechanisms is an emphasis on the 
importance of mechanistic reasoning to understanding the world. On the other hand, it 
asks: what is the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms? It answers that in modern 
evolutionary biology, the scope of mechanistic reasoning extends to integrate with a 
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ON PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION:  




 This chapter introduces the background literature that motivates this dissertation 
project. Because the new philosophy of mechanisms has been developed in light of 
dissatisfaction with previous philosophical views of scientific explanation, I briefly 
review six previous ‘models’ of scientific explanation and the primary objections that set 
their demise. I then briefly introduce the key philosophical moves and contributions that 
are treated as fundamental to the new philosophy of mechanisms.  
 
2.2 Introduction 
The new philosophy of mechanisms has been developed in light of 
insurmountable challenges raised against previous models of scientific explanation. In 
Section 2.2, I will briefly describe six major models of scientific explanation that precede 
the philosophy of mechanisms, along with the major problems, issues, and objections. In 
Section 2.3, I will briefly review the key philosophical moves that are attributed to the 
new philosophy of mechanisms.  
  
10 
2.3 Models of Scientific Explanation and Their Pitfalls 
I group philosophical efforts to characterize the nature of scientific explanation 
into two categories. On the one hand, there is a group of models that construe scientific 
explanations as arguments. On the other hand, there is a group of models that construe 
scientific explanations as assemblies of information. 
 
2.3.1 Explanations as Arguments 
The Deductive-Nomological (DN) Model construed scientific explanations as 
deductive arguments (Hempel, 1942, 1965; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948).1 To explain a 
phenomenon is to show how it is “a logical consequence” of premises that express (a) 
empirical observations and (b) law(s) of nature. On the DN Model, for example, the 
current position of Mars (conclusion) is a logical consequence of Newtonian laws of 
motion (premise 1) and previous observations of the position of Mars (premise 2) 
(Woodward, 2014). This exemplar deductive argument is the explanation of the present 
position of Mars, according to the DN Model. 
The DN Model, however, failed to capture a few key features of scientific 
explanation and reasoning. First, in its original formulation, the DN Model was unable to 
accommodate statistical laws. Second, it was unable to accommodate scientific 
conclusions that are probabilistic. Yet many laws in biology are statistical and rarely are 
scientific conclusions nonprobabilistic (i.e., certain). To use the first classic example, 
scientists might appeal to statistical laws in order to assign a high probability that a 
                                                
1 Although core development of the DN Model is best attributed to Hempel and 
Oppenheim, other proponents include Popper (1935, 1959), Braithwaite (1953), Gardner 
(1959), and Nagel (1965).  
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patient who takes penicillin will recover from streptococcus. This argument pattern 
considers statistical laws and its conclusion considers a high probability, but not absolute 
certainty. So Hempel (1965) developed two new models of scientific explanation – the 
Deductive Statistical (DS) Model and the Inductive Statistical (IS) Model – to 
accommodate scientific explanations that appeal to statistical laws or involve uncertain 
conclusions.  
A handful of insurmountable objections set the demise of the DN, DS, and IS 
Models. Although these three models offer distinct philosophical accounts of scientific 
explanation, each are problematized by the same set of counterexamples. So, from here 
on, I will refer to these three models as the ‘DN/DS/IS Model.’ The DN/DS/IS Model, 
which treated scientific explanations as arguments, ultimately met its demise in light of 
two basic counterexamples.  
First, arguments do not effectively capture the causal asymmetry of explanation. 
Consider this classic counterexample: given the position of the sun and the length of the 
shadow of a flagpole, one can infer the height of the flagpole (Bromberger, 1966). This 
inference using basic geometry fits the DN/DS/IS Model quite well. Do we want to say, 
however, that the length of the shadow explains the height of the flagpole? We do not. 
Rather, what we want to say is that the reverse is true: that the height of the flagpole (and 
the position of the sun) explains the length of the shadow. The reason is that the sun 
causes the length of the shadow. Consequently, causal asymmetry is embedded in 
explanation. In other words, the DN/DS/IS Model allows for a problematic 




The DN/DS/IS Model was met with a second classic counterexample. In addition 
to failing to capture the causal asymmetry of explanation, argument patterns also fail to 
rule out explanatorily irrelevant information. Salmon (1971) devised this problematic 
argument that fits the DN/DS/IS Model: 
Premise 1:  Mr. Jon Jones takes birth control (empirical observation) 
Premise 2:  Men who take birth control do not get pregnant (law of nature) 
Conclusion:  Mr. Jon Jones will not get pregnant (consequence of P1 and P2) 
The problem is that Mr. Jon Jones will not get pregnant regardless of whether or not he 
takes birth control, so the argument pattern permits information that is explanatorily 
irrelevant to count as part of the explanation. The philosophical upshot is that a 
satisfactory account of scientific explanation should restrict cases like these, so the 
DN/DS/IS Model is inherently problematic. 
In an effort to provide a model of scientific explanation that does not succumb to 
the counterexamples involving causal asymmetry and explanatory irrelevancies, Philip 
Kitcher (1981, 1989) developed the Unificationist (U) Model of scientific explanation.2 
Like the DN/DS/IS Model, the U Model treats scientific explanations as arguments, as it 
grounds explanatory unification in terms of schematic arguments, composed of schematic 
sentences, into triple argument patterns. Unlike the DN/IS Model, however, the U Model 
does not suggest that scientific explanation works by showing that a phenomenon is to be 
expected, given initial conditions. Rather, scientific explanation works by unifying a 
range of phenomena under a single account.  
                                                
2 Note that Kitcher’s U Model was developed in light of a similar Unificationist model 
provided by Friedman (1974)  
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The basic idea is this: a major feature of scientific explanation is showing how 
there are key connections and relationships between phenomena that are treated as 
unrelated. Newton, for example, unified terrestrial and celestial theories of motion 
(Woodward, 2014). Maxwell, too, unified theories of magnetism and electricity. 
Unification seems prominent in the history of evolutionary theory as well. Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection unified a variety of phenomena (e.g., biological diversity and 
geographical distribution) under a single theory. We might treat the modern evolutionary 
synthesis as a unification of different fields of biology as well.  
While Kitcher (1989) worked to show how the U Model could accommodate the 
causal asymmetries and explanatory irrelevancies that plagued the DN/DS/IS Model, his 
account ultimately succumbed to similar objections (Barnes, 1992; Craver, 2007; 
Woodward, 2003, 2014). Most notably, the U Model fails to capture the heterogeneity of 
unification in science. While it is evident, that is, that unification is an objective of at 
least some scientists, there are a variety of different ways that scientists unify in practice 
– and there is no single U Model characterization that can capture the variety of 
unification across the sciences. So even if scientific explanation works via unification, 
Kitcher’s U Model fails to accommodate all the diverse cases and kinds (i.e., the 
heterogeneity) of unification across the sciences.  
There is the deeper challenge that although it may be accurate that unification is 
an objective of scientific practice, it is unclear that the act of unification is actually 
explanatory. Craver (2007, p. 42), for example, offers instances of unification that are not 
explanatory, such as the construction of phylogenetic tree hypotheses. Although tree 
hypotheses unify a variety of phenomena (species, for example) under a single account, it 
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is not clear that these tree hypotheses are explanatory. 
 
2.3.2 Scientific Explanations as Assemblies of Information 
All subsequent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation have abandoned 
one fundamental tenet of the DN/DS/IS Model and the U Model: scientific explanations 
are arguments. In addition to the challenges of articulating laws (Mitchell, 1997; 
Woodward, 2000), causal asymmetries, and explanatory irrelevancies, both the 
DN/DS/IS Model and the U Model failed to capture the fact that, in many cases of 
scientific explanation, scientists simply are not building arguments. Salmon was the first 
to push in a new direction that construed scientific explanation not as argumentation, but 
rather, the assemblage of various kinds of explanatorily relevant information. Because the 
DN/DS/IS Model and the U Model both struggled with explanatory relevance and low 
probability explanations (which are ubiquitous in science), Salmon (1971) first devised 
the Statistical Relevance (SR) Model, which construed scientific explanation as the 
assembly of information that distinguishes statistically relevant relationships and 
properties from relationships and properties that are statistically irrelevant. 
A huge upshot of the SR Model was that it could accommodate both low 
probability explanations as well as counterexamples (to previous models) involving 
explanatorily irrelevant information. One of the key examples that broke the DN/DS/IS 
Model – an argument pattern that cites a male who takes birth control as explaining the 
male’s failure to get pregnant – is handled rather easily with the SR Model. Regardless of 
whether males take birth control, they will not get pregnant. So the notion that a male 
takes birth control is statistically irrelevant and ruled out by the SR Model. The SR 
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Model, that is, restricts information involved in scientific explanations to statistically 
relevant information. 
Eventually, Salmon (1984) bolstered his SR Model in favor of the Causal-
Mechanical (CM) Model, which focused on an aspect of explanation in fundamental 
physics missed by all previous models described above: causality. The DN/DS/IS Model 
failed to capture the asymmetry of causal relationships entirely. The U Model came with 
the promise that it would make sense of causal relationships via unification, a promise 
not borne out (Barnes, 1992; Craver, 2007; Woodward, 2003, 2014). It seems as well that 
Salmon recognized a similar flaw in his SR Model, as statistical relationships 
(correlations, for example) do not entail causal relationships. Moreover, the identification 
of causal relationships, Salmon (1984) argues, is what really lies at the heart of scientific 
explanation. 
On the CM Model, a crucial aspect of all scientific explanation is grounded in 
efforts to distinguish causal relationships and connections from those that are not. For 
Salmon, to explain a phenomenon is to situate the phenomenon in the causal structure of 
the world. The CM Model is designed to capture this aspect of scientific explanation at 
the level of fundamental physics by distinguishing genuine causal processes from 
noncausal pseudo-processes. What is unique about causal processes is that they have the 
capacity to transmit a mark (Salmon, 1984).3 The basic idea is that a causal interaction 
occurs when two causal processes intersect and leave a ‘mark’. Here, a ‘mark’ is simply a 
generic term meant to capture some property or feature of causal processes that we can 
track.  
                                                
3 Salmon (1984, p. 147) attributes the term ‘mark transmission’ to Hans Reichenbach. 
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On the CM Model, we treat a flying baseball as a causal process because it has the 
capacity to transmit a mark on other causal processes. So, for example, when a flying 
baseball strikes the brittle glass window, it leaves a very significant ‘mark’, as the glass 
shatters. This sort of causal process is distinguished from a pseudo-process because the 
latter does not have the capacity to transmit a mark. Feel free to take a moment now and 
wave your hand in front of the nearest light source. As your hand blocks light, it will 
leave a shadow across your desk: you will see a shadow move in conjunction with the 
motion of your hand. Your shadow, however, does not stick – it cannot transmit a mark 
on your desk. Why? On Salmon’s (1984) CM Model, the reason is that your shadow is a 
pseudo-process that is not causal, because it fails to produce a mark transmission.4 
With the broader picture of an ongoing philosophical attempt to characterize 
scientific explanation in mind, the CM Model provides the following analysis. That your 
hand’s shadow is a pseudo-process explains why it failed to leave a mark on the table. On 
the other hand, that the moving baseball is a causal process explains why it did leave a 
mark on the pane of glass. While Salmon (1984) does not characterize it in this way, the 
CM Model construes scientific explanation as the assembly of a certain kind of 
information: causal information. To explain natural phenomena is to identify and 
assemble the information that places the phenomena in the causal structure of the world. 
                                                
4 Salmon’s favorite example involved a large, circular room with a spinning spotlight in 
the center. The light traveling from the spotlight to the wall is a causal process, but the 
spot of light moving along the wall is only a pseudo process. This distinction is achieved 
because the former has the capacity to transmit a mark, but the latter does not. For 
example, if one inserts a red filter over the spotlight, the beam of light will be red, thus 
transmitting a mark. As the red spot travels across the wall, however, no red mark is left 
behind, as it is not a causal process.  
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The shortcomings of this approach set the basis for many contributions to the new 
philosophy of mechanisms, which are discussed in the following section.  
 
2.4 The New Philosophy of Mechanisms 
A key goal of this dissertation is to make clear what the ‘new philosophy of 
mechanisms’ actually is. Here let’s set out some of the key philosophical moves that are 
often treated as core or foundational to the new philosophy of mechanisms. I will focus as 
well on the manner in which these philosophical contributions are developed in light of 
shortcomings of the preceding models of scientific explanation. In a word, this may be 
the very best way to capture the new philosophy of mechanisms: it is a disparate set of 
independent attempts to capture the aspects of scientific explanation and reasoning 
missed by the DN/DS/IS, U, and SR/CM Models.  
Many of the contributions constitutive of the new philosophy of mechanisms stem 
from a basic set of dissatisfactions of all preceding accounts. First, the new philosophers 
of mechanisms have abandoned the notion that scientific explanations are arguments. 
While scientists do in fact invoke arguments, it is unclear that arguments are explanatory. 
Second, the new philosophers have abandoned the notion that scientific explanation in 
some way must always connect with laws or regularities of nature (Cartwright, 1983). 
Again, while the search for and identification of laws may be a key component of some 
scientific practice, genuine laws are few and far between (Beatty et al., 1997). Third, 
scientific explanation is not reductionistic.5 Most new mechanists recognize that 
                                                
5 Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and Sarkar (1992) offer a useful distinction between 




explanations, especially in biology, are genuinely multilevel. We cannot explain animal 
cognition or genetic drift by appeal to fundamental physics. Fourth, causality is key. A 
thorough perspective of what modern scientists are doing demonstrates attention to the 
causal structure of the world.  
 
2.4.1 Decomposition and Localization 
 The first thorough articulation of mechanistic explanation traces back to Bechtel 
and Richardson’s (2010) Discovering Complexity. Informed by 10 years of research on 
cognitive neuroscience, Bechtel and Richardson offered an account of ‘mechanistic 
explanation’ very distinct from Salmon’s (1984) CM Model. Unlike fundamental 
physics, cognitive neuroscientists explain the world by searching for and discovering of 
mechanisms. They outline two basic strategies of investigation and explanation that 
underpin this practice: decomposition and localization. Things to be explained are treated 
as organized systems, composed of functioning parts. Decomposition refers to the 
strategy of breaking a system into functional parts. So, for example, neuroscientists might 
decompose the brain into various subregions with an eye for divergent functional roles. 
Localization, on the other hand, refers to the strategy of determining which parts of a 
mechanism (or broader system) are associated with different subfunctions. So, for 
example, neuroscientists might localize the hippocampus as the subregion responsible in 
                                                                                                                                            
new mechanists is epistemological reductionsism, as opposed to ontological 
reductionsism. That is, while most of the new mechanists likely believe that nothing 
exists ‘over and above’ the sum of the constitutive parts of higher-level mechanisms 
(ontological reductionism), they do not believe that knowledge or explanation of higher-
level mechanisms can be ‘reduced’ to lower level parts or entities. 
  
19 
part for memory. This, however, is only a toy example. Bechtel and Richardson go to 
great lengths to reveal the intricacies of neuroscientific investigation and localization in 
light of the mechanistic strategies of decomposition and localization. Details aside, the 
key take-home of their contribution is the recognition that, over and above appeal to laws, 
unification, and construction of arguments, neuroscientists have been highly successful in 
explaining the brain by searching for and discovering the ‘mechanisms’ that are 
responsible for phenomena. 
 
2.4.2 Organization 
Another key contribution to the new philosophy of mechanisms involves attention 
to the role of organization in scientific explanation. In the search for and discovery of 
mechanisms, the spatial arrangement of biological systems is crucial to its explanation. 
Genetic mechanisms of replication are not just a jumble of nucleotides, subproteins, 
proteins, channels, and macromolecules. Rather, mechanisms of replication require a 
rather specific kind of spatial arrangement, if the system is to function properly. Wimsatt 
(1997) made a careful conceptual distinction between organization and aggregativity, 
which is key to making sense of mechanisms. Aggregativity is merely the sum of parts in 
no particular spatial arrangement. Scoop up a handful of warm beach sand, zoom in with 
a microscope, and you will see an aggregation of parts into a sum. Feel free to swap out 
and rearrange various grains of sand in your palm and the behavior of the system will see 
no change. This is because the palm of sand does not exhibit organization, but only 
aggregativity. In other words, the spatial arrangement of the parts of aggregative system 
is irrelevant to the behavior or function of the system as a whole.  
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Mechanistic organization, on the other hand, places constraints on the spatial 
arrangement of entities or parts constitutive of a larger system. Take apart your clock, 
swap a few gears, and it most certainly will not work. While new mechanists treat 
organization as a spectrum phenomenon, all mechanisms exhibit at least some degree of 
organization. That scientists investigate and explain the world by revealing the 
organization of biological systems is a key point underlying the new philosophy of 
mechanisms.  
 
2.4.3 Thinking About Mechanisms in Molecular  
Biology and Neuroscience 
The most influential contribution to the new philosophy of mechanisms is 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver’s (2000) “Thinking about Mechanisms.” They, too, 
describe the search for and discovery of mechanisms as characteristic of successful 
practice in neuroscience and molecular biology. They treat ‘thinking in terms of 
mechanisms’ as a new framework for addressing a litany of philosophical topics 
including laws, causality, scientific change, and reduction. The role and value of thinking 
about mechanisms in molecular biology has been thoroughly analyzed and articulated by 
Darden (2006). Craver (2007) extends this analysis to neuroscience. Both projects further 
develop conceptions of ‘mechanism’ and mechanistic explanation, especially as it 
contrasts to previous accounts of explanation (i.e., the DN/DS/IS Model, U Model, and 
the SR/CM Model).  
They key take-home for this prominent contribution to the philosophy of 
mechanisms is the rejection of the views that scientists explain by (a) building arguments, 
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(b) appealing to laws of nature, and (c) explaining phenomena by reducing it to 
fundamental physics. In this sense, these contributions demonstrate the autonomy of 
biological science as a domain of investigation and explanation that is informative, 
independent of what is going at the level of fundamental physics. At the heart of 
investigative and explanatory success, moreover, are mechanisms. To explain various 
aspects of the world is to identify the mechanism responsible for the phenomenon. This 
requires an elucidation of the various parts/entities6 of a system, the organization of those 
parts, and the individual activities/interactions7 of the various parts. By elucidating 
mechanisms, molecular biologists not only reveal why systems behave the way they do, 
but importantly, they reveal how systems work.  
 
2.4.4 Mechanisms and Causality 
There is a very important sense in which the new philosophy of mechanisms is 
inspired by Salmon’s efforts to associate explanation with the causal structure of the 
world. The practices of molecular biology and neuroscientists reveal the importance of 
causal processes and interactions to scientific explanation. On my view, there are two 
basic ways in which the metaphysics of causality are constitutive of the new philosophy 
of mechanisms. For most of the new mechanists (but not all), a key feature of 
mechanisms is that they are causal. Elucidating the mechanism of protein synthesis is 
                                                
6 Some new mechanists treat mechanisms as composed of ‘parts’, others ‘entities’. It is 
unclear that anything substantial hangs on the distinction. I use ‘parts/entities’. 
7 Some new mechanists construe the parts/entities of mechanisms as engaged in 
‘activities’, others ‘interactions’. Tabery (2004) reconciles the distinction and makes a 
proposal for the concept of ‘interactivity’.  
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explanatory partly because it reveals the causal interactions that result in the construction 
of proteins. An upshot of mechanistic explanation, then, is that it helps us understand the 
importance of causality to scientific investigation and discovery. So, on the one hand, an 
important task of the new philosophy of mechanisms is providing a philosophical account 
of just how it is that mechanisms are causal. In this respect, there is a growing amount of 
philosophical literature regarding mechanisms and the metaphysics of causation. 
Craver and Tabery (2015) couch attempts to account for the causes in 
mechanisms into four basic camps. First are those who adopt a later version of Salmon’s 
(1984) mark transmission account, which replaces the notion of a ‘mark’ with the 
exchange of ‘conserved quantities.’ This conserved quantities account of causation, 
developed by Salmon (1994) and Dowe (1992), construes causal interactions as only 
those physical exchanges that involve the exchange and conservation of some quantity of 
information. So, that the cue ball knocks the eight ball is a causal interaction because the 
cue ball exchanges a certain quantity of momentum to the eight ball.   
There are also those who have adopted a counterfactual account of causation in 
the mechanisms literature. On the counterfactual account, causation is understood not in 
terms of physical interactions, but rather, what could or would have happened, had things 
been otherwise. So, the cue ball caused the eight ball to be move because, had the cue 
ball not struck the eight ball, the eight ball would not have moved. This counterfactual 
account is most thoroughly developed by Woodward (2001, 2002) and versions of it have 
been endorsed by both Glennan (2002) and Craver (2007). 
Other new mechanists have downplayed the promise of developing a general 
account of causation and, instead, couched the causal powers of mechanisms in terms of 
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the ‘activities’ of their parts (Bogen, 2004, 2008; Machamer, 2004). These activity-based 
accounts rest on the view that there are only instances of causal activities in which the 
parts of mechanisms engage, such as binding, winding, pushing, pulling, etc. So, on this 
view, the cue ball causes the eight ball to move because the cue ball engages in a specific 
causally powerful activity – perhaps ‘knocking’. 
 These three basic approaches to causes in mechanisms all apply general views 
about causation specifically to the concept of mechanism. There is, however, a second 
manner in which causality is tethered with the new philosophy of mechanisms. A 
prominent new mechanist, Stuart Glennan (1996, 2002, forthcoming), has gone to great 
efforts not just to show that mechanisms are causal, but rather, to employ mechanisms as 
the basis of causation. On his view, all causal connections exist in virtue of mechanisms. 
So, for example, what causes the baseball to break the glass window? A mechanism. 
Although Glennan’s mechanistic account of causality has been met with criticism 
(Kistler, 2009; Woodward, 2013), the project of developing an account of causality based 
on the notion of mechanism represents a key move in the new philosophy of mechanisms.  
 Elsewhere, I argue with Tabery that these various accounts of causality in 
mechanisms reveal a valuable historical tracing (Matthews & Tabery, forthcoming). For 
each of the major accounts of causality adopted by the new mechanists, there is a 
historically analogous response to Hume’s problem of causation. We show, for example, 
that the activities approach traces back to Anscombe’s (1993) response to Hume, which 
effectively abandons efforts to provide a general theory of causation. We show as well 
that the counterfactual approach traces back to Lewis’ (1973) response to Hume, which is 
grounded in the semantics of counterfactual difference-making. One of the important 
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upshots of this historical perspective is that it helps alleviate some of the prominent 
criticisms that trouble accounts of causality in the mechanisms literature. In many cases, 
that is, it turns out that new mechanists are criticized for failing to meet operational 
criteria they never endorsed in the first place.  
 
2.5 On Solidarity and Scope 
Although the new philosophers of mechanism have done well to develop an 
account of scientific explanation that resolves the major problems that plagued preceding 
accounts, the foundational commitments and scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms 
remain unclear. In the following two subsections, I highlight two aspects of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms that will be further articulated by this dissertation. 
 
2.5.1 Solidarity 
The 20-year span that comprises the foundational projects that I treat as the new 
philosophy of mechanisms (from 1993 on) is rich. Core contributions to the philosophy 
of mechanisms come from a variety of different authors (Bechtel, Craver, Darden, 
Glennan, Machamer, Richardson, etc.). A variety of different case sciences inform the 
philosophy of mechanisms (e.g., molecular biology, cognitive neuroscience, 
neurobiology, and neuroscience proper). The various new mechanists tackle a variety of 
distinct philosophical goals (e.g., some target scientific discovery, others explanation, 
others causation).  
Moreover, there are a variety of problems within the new philosophy of 
mechanisms that divide various proponents. There is, for example, a debate about 
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whether or not natural selection is a mechanism (Barros, 2008; Havstad, 2011; 
Matthewson & Calcott, 2011; Skipper & Millstein, 2005). There is a debate about 
whether mechanistic explanations are ontic or epistemic. Craver (2007), for example, 
champions an ontic account of explanation, which maintains that the things that are 
explanatory are the actual mechanisms that exist in the world. Bechtel (2008), on the 
other hand, maintains an epistemic view of explanation, maintaining that what explains 
are the representations of mechanisms.8 There is also the more fundamental disagreement 
as to how to define ‘mechanism’ in the first place (Illari & Williamson, 2012; Matthews, 
2016). It is for these reasons that this dissertation addresses the question: what is the new 
philosophy of mechanisms? 
 
2.5.2 Scope 
Foundational work in the philosophy of mechanisms starts with neuroscience 
(Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007) and molecular biology (Darden, 2006). However, the scope 
of the new mechanistic philosophy across the sciences remains unclear. A case has been 
made for the new mechanistic philosophy in a variety of different disciplines including 
neuroeconomics, organic chemistry, behavior genetics, cell biology, physics, and 
astrophysics (Bechtel, 2006, 2008; Craver & Alexandrova, 2008; Illari & Williamson, 
2012; Ramsey, 2008; Tabery, 2014; Teller, 2010; Thagard, 2006). The full impact of the 
new philosophy of mechanisms has not yet been considered in modern evolutionary 
biology.   
                                                
8 The distinction between ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation is both subtle and 
complicated, tracing back to Salmon (1982). See Illari (2013) for a thorough analysis of 
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MECHANISMS: METAPHYSICS, EPISTEMOLOGY,  
METHODOLOGY, AND DEFINITIONS9 
 
3.1 Preface 
 This reprint works to answer the question: what is the new philosophy of 
mechanisms? It considers an alternative account of the new philosophy of mechanisms: 
Arnon Levy’s (2013) tripartite model. Levy breaks the philosophy of mechanisms into 
three basic groups: Explanatory Mechanism (EM), Strategic Mechanism (SM), and 
Causal Mechanism (CM). I apply Levy’s tripartite model to a recent debate regarding 
whether or not natural selection is a mechanism. In light of this debate, I show that 
Levy’s model fails to exhaust all the theses related to new philosophy of mechanisms. In 
addition to these regarding mechanistic explanation, mechanistic methods, and 
mechanistic causality, there is a more fundamental project of defining what a mechanism 
is in the first place, which I call ‘Definitional Mechanism’. Closing the gap between 
definitional accounts of ‘mechanism’ and how the term is used in scientific practice gives 
                                                
9 This article was published with permission from Elsevier. Matthews, L. J. (2016). On 
closing the gap between philosophical concepts and their usage in scientific practice: A 
lesson from the debate about natural selection as a mechanism. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 55, 21—28. 
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rise to challenge of application. I reveal a normative component to the philosophy of 
mechanisms by showing how various new mechanists have addressed the challenge of 
application. I make a case for pluralism regarding mechanism concepts. The upshot is the 
view that the new philosophy of mechanisms comprises views about mechanistic 
explanation, mechanistic methods of investigation, mechanistic causality, definitional 
mechanism, and norms regarding how scientists use definitional accounts. What is 
common to all these projects underpinning the new philosophy of mechanisms is that 
they are driven by mechanistic reasoning. 
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a b s t r a c t
In addition to theorizing about the role and value of mechanisms in scientiﬁc explanation or the causal
structure of the world, there is a fundamental task of getting straight what a ‘mechanism’ is in the ﬁrst
place. Broadly, this paper is about the challenge of application: the challenge of aligning one’s philo-
sophical account of a scientiﬁc concept with the manner in which that concept is actually used in sci-
entiﬁc practice. This paper considers a case study of the challenge of application as it pertains to the
concept of a mechanism: the debate about whether natural selection is a mechanism. By making clear
what is and is not at stake in this debate, this paper considers various strategies for dealing with the
challenge of application and makes a case for deﬁnitional pluralism about mechanism concepts.
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1. Introduction
I honor Darwin’s struggles as much as his successes, and I focus on
his few weaknesses for entry points of revisiondhis acknowledged
failure to solve the “problem of diversity,” or his special pleading for
progress in the absence of any explicit rationale from the operation
of his central mechanism of natural selection.
- Stephen J. Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (2002, p. 47).
It is quite common for scientists to refer to natural selection as a
mechanism. Given recent and prevalent philosophical attention to
the nature of mechanisms and their role in scientiﬁc explanation,
one is inclined to ask: is natural selection a mechanism in the
technical sense? After all, both scientists and philosophers have
already theorized and debated about the nature of natural selection
for decades (Bouchard & Rosenberg, 2004; Horan, 1994; Matthen &
Ariew, 2002; Millstein, 2006; Sober, 1984; Walsh, Lewens, & Ariew,
2002). It is perhaps unsurprising that some philosophers of biology
are currently engaging in a debate about whether natural selection
is a mechanism (Barros, 2008; Havstad, 2011; Illari & Williamson,
2010; Matthewson & Calcott, 2011; Nicholson, 2012; Skipper &
Millstein, 2005).
Instead of offering a resolution or answer to the debate about
natural selection as a mechanism, this paper works to highlight
what philosophers can learn from it. It does this by assessing what
is at stake in the debate about natural selection as a mechanism. In
other words, it assesses which philosophical theses or positionsdif
anydmight be problematized by the notion that natural selection
is not a mechanism. First, Section 2 makes clear what is not at stake
in the debate. There I consider three proposals from Levy (2013) for
what “might” be at stakedtheses regarding mechanistic explana-
tion, methods of investigation, and causalitydand argue that none
of them are actually at issue.
Second, Section 3 makes a case for what is at stake in the debate
and what we can learn from it. What is really at stake in the debate* Tel.: þ1 (801) 581 8161 (ofﬁce).
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is something fundamental to any view about the relation between
mechanisms and scientiﬁc explanation or causality: the concept of
a mechanism itself. What we learn from this are three strategies for
closing the gap between the manner in which scientists and phi-
losophers think and talk about mechanisms, as well as perks and
pitfalls for each. On one strategy, philosophers might offer a deﬁ-
nitional account of mechanism that is broad and permissive, in
order to capture the sundry uses of the term in scientiﬁc practice.
On another strategy, philosophers might push highly restrictive
conceptions of mechanism with a normative standard, which
would render incorrect many uses of the term ‘mechanism’ in
scientiﬁc practice. I recommend a third strategy that maintains a
kind of deﬁnitional pluralism about mechanism concepts. On this
strategy, distinct conceptions of mechanism are not in competition,
but rather designed to capture the manner in which mechanism is
used and understood differently in various disciplines or ﬁelds of
scientiﬁc practice.
The three strategies described above consider speciﬁcally
problems for philosophical conceptions of mechanism and their
role in scientiﬁc practice. These strategies, however, may be of in-
terest to a broader audience of philosophers of science. ‘Mecha-
nism’ is just one instance of many in which scientists use a term of
philosophical interest in a variety of different waysd‘modularity’
and ‘function,’ for example. For those general philosophers of sci-
ence motivated by the manner in which scientists actually employ
these key scientiﬁc concepts, the three strategies described in
Section 3 may work as a useful guide.
2. Three proposals for what is at stake
Levy (2013) considers three kinds of “Mechanism theses”d-
views associated with the philosophy of mechanismsdas candi-
dates for “what is, or might be, at stake” in the debate about natural
selection as a mechanism (p. 109). On Levy’s reasoning, a Mecha-
nism thesis is ‘at stake’ if it might be refuted by the notion that
natural selection is not a mechanism. In this section, I consider
Levy’s model of the philosophy of mechanisms and assess his ar-
guments for why some of these Mechanism theses might be at
stake. My analysis differs from Levy’s, however, in two important
ways. First, Levy’s analysis is a noncommittal exploration of the
issue. He does not assert what is or is not at stake, but rather what
might or could be at stake. My analysis, in contrast, offers a full-
ﬂedged account of what is and is not at stake in the debate.
The second manner in which my analysis differs from Levy’s
regards the source of the debate about natural selection as a
mechanism: Skipper and Millstein (2005). It will become evident
that while Levy and others attribute to Skipper and Millstein a
strong claim that “natural selection is not a mechanism,” in what
follows I defend a weaker reading of their arguments. A closer look
at Skipper and Millstein’s concerns for natural selection as a
mechanism reveals a different sort of philosophical claimdan
epistemological worrydregarding the challenges of accurately
characterizing natural selection as a mechanism.
2.1. Mechanistic explanation and natural selection
Could amechanistic account of explanation be at stake in light of
the debate about natural selection as a mechanism? Levy (2013)
tethers the new philosophy of mechanisms to a set of theses
regarding the explanatory relevance of mechanisms or mechanistic
information to scientiﬁc explanation (i.e., EM):
Explanatory Mechanism (EM) is a thesis about explanatory
relevance: it states that to explain a phenomenon, one must cite
mechanistic information, i.e. specify underlying parts and their
organization. EM contrasts with other general accounts of
explanation, such as the Deductive-Nomological model. (p. 100).
Proponents of mechanistic explanation in biological science are
perhaps the most familiar new mechanists. While the accounts
vary in detail and discipline, all can be understood as defending a
similar philosophical thesis that successful explanations make
explicit appeal to mechanisms or the features/properties of
mechanisms, such as parts/entities, activities/interactions,1 and
organization (Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007; Darden, 2006;
Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000).
It is not prima facie obvious that a mechanistic account of
explanation is at stake with respect to the question of whether
natural selection is a mechanism. Levy (2013, p. 112) provides the
following argument for whyd“potentially at least”dthe case of
natural selection may cause trouble for the key tenets of mecha-
nistic explanation. First, in some cases (including natural selection),
the mechanistic details (e.g., parts and organization) are not
explanatorily relevant.2 In those cases, the best explanatory ap-
proaches are probabilistic and populational. Moreover, we might
read Skipper and Millstein (2005) as making a related point that
natural selection is not composed of parts, nor does it have stable
organization. Therefore, if Skipper and Millstein (2005) and
Strevens (2008) are right, then natural selection is a case in which
parts and organization are not explanatorily relevant and, conse-
quently, it is a case that problematizes the key tenets of mechanistic
explanation.
This argument, though, raises two difﬁcult questions. First, Levy
assumes a rather strong commitment on behalf of proponents of
mechanistic explanation: namely, that a mechanistic approach
ought to apply equally well to all phenomena of explanatory in-
terest to scientists. But is it a burden of the mechanistic view of
explanation that all natural phenomena ought to be explained
mechanistically? The foundational projects for mechanistic
explanationdBechtel and Richardson (1993/2010), Machamer et al.
(2000), Darden (2006), Craver (2007) and Bechtel (2008)ddo not
endorse any strong monism about explanation across the sciences.
Rather, these contributions highlight the value of mechanistic
thinking to speciﬁc disciplines; namely, molecular biology and
cognitive neuroscience. It does not follow that an account of
mechanistic explanation is at stake in the event that natural se-
lection is a phenomenon that is best explained with non-
mechanistic methods, such as population statistics. It could sim-
ply be that while synapses and protein synthesis are best explained
mechanistically, natural selection is not. This would not demand a
rejection or reformulation of the new mechanistic account of
explanation.
Levy’s argument, however, motivates a second important
question regarding his interpretation of Skipper and Millstein
(2005). He interprets them as providing the argument that natu-
ral selection is not a mechanism, because they raise “problems such
as whether natural selection has parts, whether it is regular in the
requisite ways etc.” (Levy, 2013, p. 112). It is not uncommon that
philosophers of biology read Skipper andMillstein as providing this
particularly strong metaphysical claim regarding the nature of
natural selection. In posing the question of whether natural selec-
tion is a mechanism, Havstad (2011) explains, “Skipper and
Millstein (2005) argue that it is not” (p. 512). But do they? While
this reading is tempting, Skipper and Millstein do not endorse such
1 While Machamer et al. (2000) construe the causality in mechanisms in terms of
‘activities,’ Glennan (2002a, 2002b) in terms of ‘interactions’. Tabery (2004) shows
how these distinct approaches are not in conﬂict, but rather, how they compliment
one another.
2 Levy cites Strevens (2008) as providing the groundwork for this premise.




a strong metaphysical claim about the nature of natural selection.
In fact, at no point do they claim strictly, “natural selection is not a
mechanism.” Rather, their arguments provide a slightly weaker
epistemic point; speciﬁcally that none of the main accounts of
mechanism can adequately characterize natural selection as a
mechanism.
Skipper and Millstein’s strategy is to highlight major features of
the primary accounts of mechanisms3 and then to assess whether
those features accurately capture or “get at” the general process of
natural selection. First, mechanisms exhibit some degree of orga-
nization,which involves some constrained spatial relation between
parts or entities. Yet, because there are so many different possible
‘organizations’ of natural selection, and the parts/entities could be
so many different phenomena (e.g., organisms, groups, pop-
ulations, environments, etc.), no single characterization of the or-
ganization of natural selection may sufﬁce:
In other words, we can give no general account of organization
in populations undergoing natural selection. And if that is right,
then there is no general mechanism, sensuMDC and Glennan, of
natural selection to be found. (pp. 338e339; emphasis original)
What is key here is that Skipper and Millstein’s point is about the
viability of a general characterization of natural selection, and not
natural selection itself. This distinction is akin to the difference
between making a claim about the model of a phenomenon as
opposed to the phenomenon itself. If they wanted to make a point
speciﬁcally about natural selection, then they would claim specif-
ically that “natural selection is not a mechanism”dbut they do not.
Rather, in every instance of their analysis, Skipper and Millstein
(2005) qualify their claims about natural selection. They do not
claim that natural selection does not exhibit organization or regu-
larity simpliciter. Rather, they claim that natural selection does not
exhibit organization or regularity in the senses outlined by either
Machamer et al. (2000) or Glennan (2002a, 2002b).
The point is analogous to making a claim about the viability of a
certain conception of art or music. In a similar way that there is
much difﬁculty in characterizing art so that it captures all possible
instantiationsdeverything from Michelangelo’s David to Duch-
amp’s Fountaindthere is difﬁculty in characterizing all possible
instantiations of natural selection as a mechanism. The point, then,
is epistemic and not metaphysical, as the challenge regards one’s
characterization of the phenomenon and not the phenomenon itself.
Skipper andMillstein (2005) should be read asmaking an epistemic
point about the difﬁculties of characterizing natural selection as a
mechanism in Machamer et al.’s sense or a mechanism in Glennan’s
sense and not as showing that natural selection is not a mechanism.
While it is important that we get straight Skipper andMillstein’s
(2005) original argument, there is a more general assumption un-
derlying Levy’s (2013) argument on this point. The assumption is
that a mechanistic explanatory framework will only be fruitful
when applied to phenomena that are, in fact, mechanistic (e.g.,
phenomena that have parts). Is it the case that the limits of
mechanistic explanation are contingent on whether the phenom-
enon of interest is mechanistic? Matthewson and Calcott’s (2011)
contribution to the debate about natural selection as a mecha-
nism is helpful here. They argue that the “relevant question is not
whether any population-level phenomenon such as natural selec-
tion is a mechanism, but whether it can be usefully modelled as
though it were a particular type of mechanism” (p. 737). They offer
interesting examples of mechanistic models of inherently non-
mechanistic phenomena, such as the Monetary Nation Income
Analogue Computer (MONIAC) in Fig. 1. MONIAC is a mechanical
model of an economy designed by economists to understand the
causal structure of economic interactions. Examples like these
provide evidence in favor of the claim that there is value in a
mechanistic explanatory approach to inherently non-mechanistic
phenomena.
MONIAC provides evidence for the value of mechanistic expla-
nations of non-mechanist phenomena in economics, but what
about the case of natural selection? Is it equally valuable to model
natural selection as a mechanism? That Futuyma’s (1997, p. 350)
textbook explanation of evolution in Fig. 2 depicts natural selection
as a toy “sieve mechanism” lends evidence to the view that
mechanistic modeling of natural selection has epistemic merit:
The natural selection sieve mechanism (adapted from Sober,
1984) represents the general process of natural selection as a me-
chanical device in which marbles of various sizes and colors are
sifted through various screens, so that only marbles of a speciﬁc
size make it to the bottom. On this explanation the marbles
represent, for example, organisms and their varying size represents
Fig. 1. Modiﬁed MONIAC from Matthewson and Calcott (2011).
3 The two primary conceptions/accounts of mechanism addressed by Skipper &
Millstein (2005) are Glennan (2002a, 2002b) and Machamer et al. (2000) as two
main conceptions of mechanism.




trait variation. The sieve mechanism represents a clear-cut case of a
mechanistic explanation of natural selection.
In light of the above considerations, there is minimal evidence
that the newmechanistic account of explanation is really at stake in
the debate about natural selection as a mechanism. On the one
hand, it is important that we clarify Skipper and Millstein’s (2005)
original challenge as one about the difﬁculties of characterizing
natural selection as a mechanism; and not as showing that natural
selection is in fact not a mechanism. On the other hand, even if
natural selection were in fact not a mechanism, it would not follow
that a mechanistic account of explanation would be at stake.
2.2. Mechanistic methods and natural selection
So far I have argued that an account of mechanistic explanation
is not really at stake in the debate about natural selection as a
mechanism. On Levy’s (2013) model, distinct from theses regarding
mechanistic explanation are theses regarding various mechanistic
strategies of scientiﬁc investigation:
Strategic Mechanism (SM) concerns the cognitive-epistemic
power of mechanistic modelling and related scientiﬁc
methods. It asserts that certain phenomena are best handled
mechanistically. Discussions of SM tend to construe ‘mecha-
nism’ fairly narrowly, in machine-like terms. (p. 100)
Notable SM methodologies include Bechtel and Richardson’s
(1993/2010) account of decomposition and localization strategies.
The bottom line for these strategies is that they treat the target
system as though it were a mechanism. This involves breaking a
system into parts and elucidating, for example, their function in
the system as a whole. Does the viability of this particular class of
mechanistic methods hinge on the notion that natural selection is
mechanism?
The arguments for why mechanistic methods might be at stake
here are the same that Levy gives for why mechanistic explanation
might be at stake. It assumesdas it did earlierdthat wemight read
Skipper and Millstein (2005) as showing either that natural selec-
tion is not a mechanism, or merely that it is non-mechanistic.4 I
have already shown that a closer look at their arguments and
conclusion do not warrant this strong reading, so I will not belabor
the point. But what of the question of whether mechanistic
methods are only valuable when applied to mechanistic phenom-
ena? Is it possible to break a system into parts if the system is not
actually composed of parts? Even if this method were possible,
would it also be valuable?
Again, Matthewson and Calcott’s (2011) discussion of MON-
IACdthe mechanistic modeling of national economiesdis relevant.
It is not my task here to assess whether a national economy is
composed of parts, but the case of MONIAC lends evidence to the
view that modeling national economies as though they are
composed of parts is a fruitful method of investigation for practicing
economists. In effect, the case of MONIAC supports the more gen-
eral view that it is valuable to approach non-mechanistic phe-
nomena, such as national economies, using mechanistic methods.
The more pertinent question asks whether mechanistic
methods are in fact fruitfully applied to scientiﬁc investigations of
natural selection. What happens whenwe look at scientiﬁc practice
with respect to investigations of natural selection? Regardless of
whether it is a force, a process, a statistical pattern, or amechanism,
Kuorikoski (2009) argues that mechanistic strategies are in fact
applied to scientiﬁc investigations of natural selection. Illari and
Williamson (2010) also argue that scientists employ the same
mechanistic strategies to investigate the mechanism of protein
synthesis as they do to investigate natural selection. Elsewhere, I
argue that “embedded mechanisms”di.e., mechanisms that are
built intomathematical modelsdenhance statistical phylogenetics,
a case that further strengthens the view that mechanistic methods
are fruitful even when applied to non-mechanistic phenomena.
Even practicing evolutionary biologists Pardo-Diaz, Salazar, and
Jiggins (2015, p. 445), take themselves to be in the business of
‘mechanism-elucidation,’ which is a key mechanistic method of
investigation on Tabery’s (2014) account. Elsewhere I argue that
statistical phylogenetics beneﬁts form ‘embedded mechanisms’
(Matthews, 2015). These are causal-mechanical explanations built
into mathematical models that are used for phylogeny estimation.
This too is evidence for the value of mechanistic approaches to non-
mechanistic phenomena. In light of weaknesses in Levy’s (2013)
argument, such as his strong reading of Skipper and Millstein
(2005), and also the aforementioned arguments from philoso-
phers of biology and claims from practicing evolutionary biologists,
it simply is not the case thatmechanistic methods are really at stake
in the debate about whether natural selection is a mechanism.
2.3. Mechanistic causality and natural selection
Because at least a few philosophers have discussed the rela-
tionship between mechanisms and the causal structure of the
world, it could be that what is at stake in the debate about natural
Fig. 2. Toy sieve mechanism of natural selection.
4 An anonymous reviewer questioned my distinction between ‘mechanistic’ and
‘a mechanism.’ If all things that are mechanistic were also mechanisms, then there
would no need for the term ‘mechanistic.’ I used ‘mechanistic’ to capture those
phenomena that are mechanism-like, but do not qualify as proper mechanisms.




selection as mechanism is a philosophical view about mechanistic
causality. Glennan (1996) claims that his “theory of mechanisms
could provide the foundation for a theory of causation” (p. 17). On
this view, mechanisms are at the source of causal interactions. Levy
(2013) deploys the concept of ‘Causal Mechanism’ (CM) to capture
views of this ilk:
Causal Mechanism (CM) is the view that causal relations, at
least outside the domain of fundamental physical phenomena,
exist in virtue of underlying mechanisms. CM rivals other ac-
counts of causation, such as regularity views. It is best seen as a
contribution to metaphysics. (p. 100)
On Levy’s view, CM is a competitor to alternative accounts of cau-
sality. It states that causal relations exist in virtue of mecha-
nismsdas opposed to, say, laws, regularities, counterfactual truths
(Lewis, 1973), mark transmissions (Salmon, 1984), the exchange of
conserved quantities (Dowe, 1992), or what might be revealed by
counterfactual interventions (Woodward, 2003).
Could this speciﬁc account of mechanistic causalitydi.e.,
Glennan’s (1996) view that causal relations exist in virtue of
mechanismsdhinge on the notion that natural selection is a
mechanism? In other words, can natural selection work as a
counterexample to the mechanistic account of causality? Perhaps,
but only if it were both the case that (1) natural selection is a causal
process and that (2) natural selection is not a (causal) mechanism.
Even Glennan (1996), however, concedes that his sense of mecha-
nistic causality may not capture all causal relations. For example, he
admits that at lower levels of analysis, Salmon’s process theory
more accurately captures the causal structure of the world. It is
perfectly plausible that natural selection is not a mechanism, and
yet Glennan’s strong sense of mechanistic causality is a perfectly
viable account of causality.5
On the potential for conﬂict between mechanistic causality
and the notion that natural selection is not a mechanism, I
completely agree with Levy (2013). In this case, more likely at
stake is “probably a reformulation of the notion of mechanism,
but not an abandonment of the mechanist view of causation”
(Levy, 2013, p. 111). In other words, to abandon Glennan’s
mechanistic account of causality because natural selection does
not meet the criteria for mechanismhood would be to throw the
baby out with the bathwater. Instead, what is need is a bit of
tinkering with the concept of a mechanism itself, so as to
accommodate the case of natural selection. While Levy only
mentions this point about the concept of a mechanism in passing,
in what follows I argue that it is precisely the concept of a
mechanism itself that is what is at stake in the debate about
natural selection as a mechanism.
3. An alternate proposal for what is at stake
In the previous section I argued that none of the three Mecha-
nism theses outlined by Levy (2013) are really at stake in the debate
about natural selection as a mechanism. If views about mechanistic
causality, mechanistic explanation, and mechanistic methods of
investigation do not hinge on the notion that natural selection is a
mechanism, then what does? Answering this question requires a
return to the source of the debate about natural selection as a
mechanism: the dissonance between the way scientists and phi-
losophers think and talk about mechanisms.
On the one hand are the practicing scientists who investigate
and explain natural selection, and commonly refer to it as a
mechanism. On the other hand are the conceptual experts on
mechanismsdthe new philosophers of mechanismdwho defend a
variety of different theses regarding the nature of mechanisms and
their role in scientiﬁc reasoning. That there is a debate about nat-
ural selection as a mechanism in the ﬁrst place highlights this very
discord between ‘mechanism-talk’di.e., use of the term ‘mecha-
nism’ by scientistsdand theoretical conceptions of mechanisms
developed by philosophers. Skipper and Millstein’s (2005) ignition
of the natural selection as a mechanism debate was motivated by
the combination of the facts that (a) scientists talk about natural
selection as though it were a mechanism and (b) the new mecha-
nists are committed to accommodating the manner in which sci-
entists talk about mechanisms.
In what follows, I show how the project of accommodating
scientiﬁc mechanism-talk actually characterizes a signiﬁcant proj-
ect in the philosophy of biology. In addition to the project of
developing philosophical accounts of mechanistic causality,
explanation, and methods of investigation, the newmechanists are
also concerned with the concept of a mechanism itselfdand this is
a fundamental element of the philosophy of mechanisms that is
missed by Levy’s (2013) tripartite taxonomy. Philosophical devel-
opment of the mechanism concepts faces what we might call a
challenge of application: the challenge of aligning one’s philosoph-
ical understanding of ‘mechanism’ with the manner in which the
term is used by scientists. At the bottom line, what is really at stake
in the debate about natural selection as a mechanism is the concept
of a mechanism itself.
In the theme of Levy’s tripartite model, this grouping of mech-
anism theses should be characterized in the following way:
Deﬁnitional Mechanism (DM): any thesis that makes claim to
the key features, properties, or criteria for what a mechanism is
e ‘mechanismhood,’ for lack of a better term. This category
should capture philosophical disputes about mechanism
‘senses,’ ‘conceptions,’ ‘characterizations,’ or ‘frameworks.’
Articulating the conditions for mechanismhood, or simply the na-
ture of mechanisms, is a large part of the philosophy of mecha-
nisms. So what is really at stake in the debate about natural
selection as a mechanism are competing accounts of DM, such as
those from Machamer et al. (2000) or Glennan (2002a, 2002b).
3.1. Three strategies for resolving the challenge of application
Above I introduced the challenge of application as the true source
of the natural selection as a mechanism debate. At the heart of this
particular question is the fact that there is dissonance between
scientiﬁc mechanism-talk and the conceptions of mechanism
developed by Glennan (2002a, 2002b) and Machamer et al. (2000).
How have the new mechanists dealt with this challenge of
application?
3.1.1. Deﬁnitional permissivism
At the source of the challenge of application is the fact that,
across the sciences, the term ‘mechanism’ can meanmany different
things. One intuitive solution is to develop a conception of mech-
anism that accommodates the myriad of uses of the term in prac-
tice. Illari and Williamson (2012), for example, provide the
following catchall deﬁnition of mechanism:
5 Note that there are many contributions to the philosophy of mechanisms that
regard causality, but do not truly ﬁt with Levy’s CM category. There are those, for
example, who construe causal relations in mechanisms in terms of ‘activities’
(Bogen, 2005, 2008; Illari & Williamson, 2013; Machamer et al., 2000; Machamer,
2004). There are also those who defend a counterfactual/interventionist account
of causality in mechanisms (Craver, 2007; Glennan, 2002a, 2002b; Joffe, 2013;
Woodward, 2002, 2011). In any case, there is no obvious way in which these
views should come in conﬂict with the notion that natural selection is or is not a
mechanism.




A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities and activ-
ities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the
phenomenon. (p. 120)
The broad scope of this deﬁnition is not incidental. Illari and Wil-
liamson make explicit their attempt to “defend a characterization
that gives an understanding of what is common to mechanisms in
all ﬁelds” (p. 120, emphasis original). This evinces a kind of deﬁni-
tional permissivism, in which the mechanism concept is intention-
ally designed to capture as many uses of the term as possible.
An advantage of deﬁnitional permissivism is that it mitigates the
challenge of application by leaving few cases to question. On Illari
and Williamson’s deﬁnition, both the mechanisms described by
astrophysicists as well as those described by molecular biologists
count as proper mechanisms. Interestingly, even a deﬁnition as
permissive as Illari andWilliamson’s does not clearly accommodate
the notion that natural selection is a mechanism. It would seem
that any conception of mechanism that accommodates the case of
natural selection must allow that the parts, activities, and organi-
zation changes over time, as it is an inherent feature of evolution by
natural selection that the organisms, the environments, and all
their sundry interactions are constantly changing from one gener-
ation to the next. Illari and Williamson (2012), however, do not
address the question as to whether the parts of a mechanism can
change over time.
Deﬁnitional permissivism, however, is a double-edged sword, as
there is the worry that a permissive conception of mechanism
might capture too much. It is not my goal here to assess Illari and
Williamson’s deﬁnitional account of mechanism in detail, but one
should recognize the ease of which many natural phenomena meet
the criteria for mechanismhood on their account. So long as some
set of entities and activitiesdboth of which are broad con-
ceptsdare responsible for a phenomenon, then that set of entities
and activities is a mechanism. This may permit things to count as
mechanisms that denigrate the value of the concept. Take, for
example, Jay, the philosophy department janitor who vacuum-
cleans the ﬂoors regularly each week. Jay and his tools (e.g., vac-
uum cleaner) are responsible for the phenomenon of philosophy
department cleaningdis this particular set of entities (Jay and his
vacuum) and activities (vacuuming) the ‘mechanism of philosophy
department cleaning’? The underlying worry is that a permissive
deﬁnition of mechanism will capture so much that usage of the
term ‘mechanism’ no longer indicates something unique or infor-
mative about theworld. The challenge then becomes showing what
is not a mechanism.6
3.1.2. Deﬁnitional restrictivism
On the approaches that work to construe mechanisms broadly,
the strategy is to cater to the manner in which the concept of a
mechanism is used in all the sciences. There is, however, an
opposite strategy to dealing with the challenge of application
evinced by recent contributions to the philosophy of mechanisms.
On this alternative approach one develops an intentionally narrow
and restrictive conception of a mechanism that puts the burden of
accommodation on the scientists. Woodward’s (2002) counterfac-
tual account of mechanism exempliﬁes a highly speciﬁc and narrow
mechanism concept:
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an
acceptable model of a mechanism is that the representation (i)
describe an organized or structured set of parts or components,
where (ii) the behavior of each component is described by a
generalization that is invariant under interventions, and where
(iii) the generalizations governing each component are also
independently changeable, and where (iv) the representation
allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and (iii), the overall
output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the
input to each component and changes in the components
themselves. (p. S375)
There are at least a few arguments that favor deﬁnitional restricti-
vism over deﬁnitional permissivism. First, the former is strong pre-
cisely where the latter is weak. While one might worry that Illari
and Williamson’s (2012) catchall deﬁnition of mechanism might
capture too much, Woodward’s (2013) narrow conception is highly
restrictive. Woodward, too, provides the argument that restrictive
conceptions are useful in that they provide a tool for distinguishing
actual mechanisms from phenomena that are referred to as
mechanism, but are not actually mechanisms (p. 64). For example,
the mechanisms of planet formation described by astrophysicists
are not likely to count as mechanisms onWoodward’s account, and
natural selection most certainly would not count as a mechanism.
Another advantage of deﬁnitional restrictivism is that a narrow
conception of mechanism allows one to assess the scope of broad
philosophical views about mechanisms. Because many natural
phenomena will not qualify as mechanisms on a restricted deﬁni-
tion, we have access to a relatively clear boundary for dis-
tinguishing the scope of, for example, a mechanistic account of
explanation. One might also argue that a restricted mechanism
concept could facilitate interﬁeld discourse. Because ‘mechanism’
could have different meanings in different contexts, there is room
for miscommunication between scientists from different ﬁelds. If
‘mechanism’ meant the same thing in all contexts, however, it is
possible that such potential for miscommunication would be
mitigated.
Yet deﬁnitional restrictivism about mechanisms has pitfalls as
well. There is the obvious worry that a narrow conception of a
mechanism will not capture enough. If the astrophysical mecha-
nisms of planet formation described by astronomers are not
mechanisms, thenwhat are they? And how arewe tomake sense of
all the mechanism talk across the sciences? There is perhaps a
deeper challenge found in the execution of, ﬁrst, devising a satis-
factory and narrow conception, and second, ﬁnding a way to
enforce it in scientiﬁc practice. Will most philosophers and scien-
tists across all disciplines and in every ﬁeld agree to use the term
‘mechanism’ in a speciﬁc way? If anything, restrictivism about
deﬁnitions of mechanism will exacerbate the challenge of appli-
cation. That is, a highly speciﬁc and normative conception of
mechanism will increase the gap between the way scientists and
philosophers think and talk about mechanisms.
3.1.3. Deﬁnitional pluralism
Permissivism and restrictivism about mechanism deﬁnitions
have opposing pitfallsdone seems to capture too much while the
other does not capture enough. In developing a functional sense of
mechanism, Garson (2013) hints at a third option: a “modest
pluralism with respect to mechanism” (p. 319). Garson only men-
tions pluralism about senses of mechanism in passing, but I take it
to be the groundwork for the most promising solution to the
challenge of application. Working from Garson’s (2013) notion, I
recommend deﬁnitional pluralism as the view that mechanism
concepts should not necessarily be in competition; but rather,
6 Note that this particularly worrydabout capturing too muchdhinges on
whether the conditions for mechanismhood outlined by Illari & Williamson (2012)
are sufﬁcient or necessary. If their account describes necessary but not sufﬁcient
conditions for mechanismhood, then the problem of capturing too much is miti-
gated. Illari and Williamson, however, do not make this distinction explicitdHat tip
to Matt Haber for highlighting this worry.




designed to capture distinct senses of mechanism and the ﬁelds in
which they are most applicable.
Deﬁnitional pluralism accepts that there are many different
senses or concepts of mechanism across the sciences. Instead of
adjudicating toward a speciﬁc mechanism concept, the task of
philosophers of science is to articulate and reﬁne these distinct
senses of mechanism and to assess their most fruitful domains of
application. On this approach, the mechanisms described by bi-
ologists should ﬁt a concept of biological mechanism and the
mechanisms described by astrophysicists should ﬁt a concept of
astrophysical mechanism. While it is not a goal here to ﬂesh out
these alternative conceptions of mechanism, one can imagine that
proteins are the relevant parts of biological mechanisms and astral
bodies are the relevant parts of astrophysical mechanisms.
Deﬁnitional pluralism about mechanisms has distinct advantages
over deﬁnitional permissivism and deﬁnitional restrictivism. While
the former approach over-generalizes the mechanism concept, the
pluralist approach can maintain a set of speciﬁc and meaningful
conceptions of mechanism. While the latter approach fails to cap-
ture countless uses of the term ‘mechanism’ across the sciences, the
pluralist approach should accommodate most of them. Moreover,
while deﬁnitional restrictivism faces an important challenge of
achieving consensusdthe problem of convincing most philoso-
phers and scientists to use the term ‘mechanism’ in a speciﬁc
mannerddeﬁnitional pluralism has a minimal requirement of
consensus.7
What are the pitfalls of mechanism concept pluralism? There is
a familiar worry that pluralism will mitigate conceptual develop-
ment by minimizing competition between theories. With singular
or monistic approaches to mechanism, like Illari and Williamson’s
(2012) and Woodward’s (2013), there is competition between
mechanists in ongoing efforts to develop the best concept of a
mechanism. By dealing and receiving challenges from competing
mechanism conceptions, each contributor works to develop
stronger conceptions of mechanism. Yet on the pluralist approach
there is less need to continue developing one’s mechanism concept,
as it may be that not everyone is competing for the same resources.
But we should still expect competition and conceptual develop-
ment between those working toward speciﬁc mechanism concepts
on the pluralist approach. That is, we should still expect philoso-
phers of biology (and biologists) to work toward the best concep-
tion of biological mechanism.
There is an additional worry that the pervasive and variable use
of ‘mechanism’ across the sciences hints at something robust and
distinct about scientiﬁc theorizing, and deﬁnitional pluralismwould
mean giving up on the pursuit to ﬁgure out precisely what links all
senses of mechanism.8 But this need not be the case. In addition to
the challenging philosophical project of identifying and articulating
a plurality of mechanism concepts across the sciences, we should
anticipate the ongoing and deeper philosophical project of identi-
fying and articulating what is common to all senses of mechanism.
Deﬁnitional pluralism is a tactic for dealing with the challenge of
application, which is effectively a normative problem. Getting to
the philosophical bedrock of ‘mechanism’, on the other hand,
should remain an ongoing task for philosophers interested in the
concept of a mechanism.
4. Conclusion
This paper is an exploration of the debate about natural selec-
tion as a mechanism. It does not try to answer whether natural
selection is, in fact, a mechanism. It elucidates instead the value of
the debate. The central question is: what can we learn from the
ongoing philosophical assessment of whether natural selection is a
mechanism? The underlying force of this project is the idea that
there is something valuable for philosophers of biologydand phi-
losophers of science in generaldin identifying what is and is not at
stake in this particular debate.
First, I made a negative point about what is not at stake in the
debate. Contra Levy’s (2013) analysis, theses or philosophical views
about the relation between mechanisms and explanation, scientiﬁc
methods of investigation, and causality are not really at stake in the
debate about natural selection as a mechanism. Second, I made a
positive case for what is at stake in the debate, which is something
fundamental to all the theses considered by Levy: the concept of a
mechanism itself. In addition to theorizing about the role and value
of mechanisms in scientiﬁc explanation or the causal structure of
the world, an important task for philosophers interested in mech-
anisms is getting straight the concept of a mechanism itself.
Third, I made a point about what beneﬁt can be derived from
this exploration of the debate about natural selection as a mecha-
nism. At the heart of this issue is a more general problem facing
philosophers of science: this is the challenge of aligning one’s
philosophical account of a scientiﬁc concept with the manner in
which the concept is actually employed by scientists. The challenge
of application, that is, is the challenge of closing the gap between
how scientists and philosophers think and talk about key scientiﬁc
concepts, such as ‘mechanism.’ While I describe three strategies for
dealing with the challenge of application, as it pertains to the
concept of a mechanism, these strategies may also be valuable
alternative scientiﬁc concepts of philosophical interest, such as
‘modularity’ or ‘function.’
On one approach, which I term deﬁnitional permissivism, the
strategy is to deﬁne a concept loosely so that it capturesmost uses of
the term across the sciences. Amajor pitfall of this approach is that it
might capture too much, thereby devaluing what is informative
about a technical concept. On a second approach, which I term
deﬁnitional restrictivism, the strategy is to develop a highly speciﬁc
and narrow concept with normative bite, so that only a subset of
scientists using the term are using it appropriately. I adjudicated
toward a third approach, deﬁnitional pluralism, inwhich strategy is to
accept that there are distinct senses of the same concept used across
the sciences. On this approach the task of the philosopher of science
is not to adjudicate toward a single sense of ‘mechanism,’ for
example, but to delineate and reﬁne each unique sense, and to
identify themost fruitful scientiﬁc disciplines or ﬁelds of application.
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CHAPTER 4
 




 This reprint works to answer the second major question undertaken by this 
dissertation: what is the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms? It addresses this 
question in the context of statistical phylogenetics – the branch of evolutionary biology 
that constructs ‘tree hypotheses’ regarding evolutionary relationships. I show how the 
development of mathematical models evinces a shift from purely statistical models to 
models positively influenced by mechanistic reasoning. By using ‘embedded 
mechanisms’, mechanistic reasoning positively influences statistical phylogenetics by 
constructing stronger tree hypotheses, as measure by LogL.  
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Embedded Mechanisms and Phylogenetics
Lucas J. Matthews*
A strong case has been made for the role and value of mechanistic explanation in neu-
roscience and molecular biology. A similar demonstration in other domains of scientiﬁc
investigation, however, remains an important challenge of scope for the new mechanists.
This article helps answer that challenge by demonstrating one valuable role mechanisms
play in phylogenetics. Using the transition/transversion (ti/tv) rate parameter as a case ex-
ample, this article argues that models embedded with mechanisms produce stronger phy-
logenetic tree hypotheses, as measured by maximum likelihood logL values. Two im-
portant implications for the new mechanistic account of explanation are considered.
1. Introduction. A recent trend in philosophy of science focuses on the cen-
tral importance of mechanisms to scientiﬁc investigation, explanation, and
understanding (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). This is typically cast
in terms of the value and role of either mechanistic explanations or strate-
gies to scientiﬁc discovery, modeling, explanation, and understanding (Craver
and Tabery, forthcoming). Yet this new mechanistic account of explanation
faces important challenges.1 One such challenge regards scope. The new mech-
anists have done well to make their case in specialized disciplines, such as
neuroscience (Bechtel and Richardson 1993/2010; Craver 2007; Bechtel
2008) and molecular biology (Darden 2006).2 Yet these life sciences are
process oriented in that they investigate proximate systems that are highly
amenable to mechanistic thinking (i.e., systems composed of interacting and
1. Sometimes called the “new mechanical philosophy,” the “New Philosophy of Mecha-
nism (NPM),” or simply the “philosophy of mechanisms.” Here I refer to this general proj-
ect as the new mechanism and its proponents as new mechanists.
2. Work has been done to extend the newmechanism to behavioral genetics (Tabery 2014),
cell biology (Bechtel 2006), cognitive science (Thagard 2006), neuroeconomics (Craver
and Alexandrova 2008), organic chemistry (Ramsey 2008), social science (Hedström and
Swedberg 1998; Hedström 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), and physics (Teller 2010).
*To contact the author, please write to: University of Utah, Department of Philosophy, Carolyn
Tanner IrishHumanities Building, 215SCentral CampusDr., 4th ﬂoor, Salt LakeCity, UT 84112;
e-mail: lucas.matthews@utah.edu.
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organized parts). Making a similar case for the value of mechanisms to other
domains of scientiﬁc investigation is the challenge of scope for the new
mechanism.
This article works to resolve the challenge of scope by revealing a role
for mechanisms in a paradigmatically nonmechanistic science: statistical
phylogenetics. Unlike the proximate, process-oriented sciences mentioned
above, phylogenetics is a ‘pattern-oriented science’ in that the explanandum
phenomena are patterns in nature (e.g., phenotypic traits or nucleotide se-
quences) rather than underlying processes (e.g., DNA replication or protein
syntheses) (see Sober 1988; Haber 2009; Velasco 2013). Moreover, unlike
the process-oriented life sciences, phylogenetics is a science driven by sta-
tistical methods and mathematical models.3 There is no obvious sense in
which practicing phylogeneticists appeal to mechanisms or mechanistic in-
formation in the manner outlined by the new mechanists. Despite this lack
of explicit appeal or representation, here I show that mechanisms play a valu-
able role in maximum likelihood (ML) methods of phylogeny estimation. I
argue speciﬁcally thatmolecularmechanisms (or the breakdown thereof ) can
be ‘embedded’ in mathematical model parameters to strengthen phyloge-
netic tree hypotheses. I discuss Kimura’s (1980) estimation of the transition/
transversion (ti/tv) rate ratio as an embedded mechanism of DNA mutation,
the application of which produces stronger tree hypotheses, as measured by
ML logL values.
Section 2 shows howMLmethods of phylogeny estimation are enhanced
by embedded molecular mechanisms, such as the ti/tv rate ratio. Section 3
ﬂeshes out the concept of an embedded mechanism and its implications for
the new mechanism and the challenge of scope. Section 4 gives conclu-
sions.
2. From Molecular Mechanisms to Maximum Likelihood
2.1. Phylogenetics Tree Hypothesis Testing and Strengthening.
Broadly, phylogenetics is a science of patterns in that it makes inferences
about evolutionary history from observed patterns of biodiversity or char-
acter distribution in nature. The products of these efforts are tree hypothe-
ses, which graphically represent evolutionary-relatedness of groups of taxa.
Phylogenetic hypotheses are valuable to any scientiﬁc explanation regard-
ing life history, such as human epidemiology (Ou et al. 1992; Harvey and
Paul 1994), ecology (Brooks 1991), and evolutionary biology (Harvey and
3. Note that this is not to confuse statistical phylogenetics with alternative cladistics ap-
proaches, such as pattern cladism. At least some proponents of the latter reject statistical
approaches entirely. This analysis, however, engages speciﬁcally approaches that incor-
porate models of evolution into their statistical methods of phylogeny estimation. For more
on this distinction see Haber (2009).
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Pagel 1991). Here I focus on one prominent approach to phylogeny esti-
mation: the ML method.
Fisher (1922) developed ML as a statistical tool estimating the proba-
bility of observing the data, given the model. Modern forms construe ML
as the probability of the evidence (E), given the hypothesis (H). ML meth-
ods of phylogeny estimation assign a logarithmic likelihood (logL) value to
tree hypotheses given (a) observed nucleotide sequences and (b) model
assumptions (parameters) of evolutionary change. In other words,MLmeth-
ods allow for the construction of competing tree hypotheses, given various
assumptions about evolutionary processes and observed genetic data.
The history of ML methods of phylogeny estimation is marked by an
informative trend. While observed nucleotide sequences remain the same,
phylogenetic tree hypotheses get stronger over time. In other words, phy-
logenetics improves tree hypotheses by analyzing the same data with better
models of evolution. Here ‘better models’ are understood as those that more
accurately accommodate subtleties of evolutionary change, often at the mo-
lecular level (Felsenstein 2004). Each tree hypothesis has a logL value, which
is treated as a measure of strength. The lower the logL value, the stronger the
hypothesis. These quantitative values of tree hypotheses allow for a simple
method of hypothesis testing in which phylogeneticists pit competing hy-
potheses against one another (Huelsenbeck and Crandall 1997). In effect,
phylogeneticists can run the same data using different models or the same
model but with different parameters. Each analysis allows for a new tree
hypothesis to be assessed against the others. In short, altering model as-
sumptions and achieving greater logL values strengthen phylogenetic tree
hypotheses.
2.2. Strengthening Tree Hypotheses with Mechanistic Model
Parameters. In order to compare tree hypotheses, phylogeneticists must
analyze the same data using different models and assumptions. This generates
competing hypotheses that phylogeneticists use to reconstruct the best phy-
logenetic tree. Models that estimate ti/tv rates are an excellent example of
how more accurate model assumptions result in stronger tree hypotheses.
One of the earliest models, JC69, made two important assumptions about
fundamental evolutionary processes. It assumed both (a) equal nucleotide
frequencies and (b) equal rates of change between nucleotides (Jukes and
Cantor 1969). Yet practicing phylogeneticists soon realized that these as-
sumptions failed to capture real processes of DNA substitution. For example,
molecular biologists recognize unique ways in which substitutions may occur
as either transitions or transversions (Freese 1959). In order to more accurately
capture biological details, Kimura (1980) developed a valuablemethod of ti/tv
rate estimation for ML tree reconstruction. More importantly, analyzing the
same nucleotide sequences with ti/tv rate parameters produces tree hypotheses
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with improved logL values (Huelsenbeck and Crandall 1997, 455). Thus, phy-
logenetic models that accommodate ti/tv rate biases produce stronger tree
hypotheses, given the data.
But what exactly is the ti/tv rate bias? Why does estimation of the bias
strengthen tree hypotheses? Although these sorts of questions are often black-
boxed by practicing phylogeneticists, their answers have important implica-
tions for the philosophy of science. A ti/tv rate bias is essentially an effect
caused by subtleties of DNA substitutions, which occur at the molecular
level. Transitions are spontaneous purine–purine or pyrimidine–pyrimidine
substitutions. Transversions are spontaneous purine–pyrimidine or pyrimi-
dine–purine substitutions. What distinguishes these two types of nucleotides
is molecular ring structure. Purines have a double-ring structure, while py-
rimidines take a single-ring structure. Moreover, these unique structural fea-
tures play an important role in how molecular biologists explain ti/tv rates of
DNA substitution (see ﬁg. 1).4
While various mechanisms of mutagenesis have been proposed over the
years (e.g., tautomeric shifts and link slippage), most scientists today at-
tribute DNA replication errors to Crick’s (1966) wobble hypothesis (Pray
2008). While a typical base pairing involves cytosine–guanine, the wobble
hypothesis explains a unique pairing of cytosine–adenine in the event that
adenine contains an extra hydrogen atom, for example. While these are of-
ten referred to as ‘mechanisms’, such phenomena are more accurately de-
scribed as the failure or breakdown of DNA error recognition and repair
mechanisms (see, e.g., Kolodner 1995; Iyer et al. 2006).
While there are many subtle differences between various scientiﬁc expla-
nations for DNA replication error, what they all have in common are mech-
anistic details. On this point Illari and Williamson’s catchall deﬁnition of
mechanism is useful: “A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of enti-
ties and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the
phenomenon” (2012, 120). There should be little dispute that any explana-
tion for the ti/tv bias involves appeal to entities, activities, and organization.
Moreover, Darden (2006) offers a systematic and persuasive case for the
mechanistic nature of molecular biology. For the purposes of this article, the
pertinent claim is that any explanation for the ti/tv rate bias will be molec-
ular biological and inherently mechanistic. It will either describe an explicit
mechanism (or the breakdown thereof ) or appeal to mechanistic details or
information, such as parts/entities, activities/interactions, or organization.
In this light, explanations for the ti/tv rate bias are inherently mechanistic
in the sense of interest to the new mechanists. These explanations show pre-
cisely how errors in the mechanism of DNA replication can give rise to per-
4. The ﬁgure is courtesy of ATDbio Nucleic Acids Book, http://www.ATDbio.com
/nucleic-acids-book.
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manent mutations. Subtle details in the manner in which various mutations
occur give rise to a nearly universal bias in favor of transitions over transver-
sions. That is, by virtue of the mechanical details of DNA replication, tran-
sitions occur at a higher rate than transversions.5 Phylogenetic models, in
turn, accommodate these mechanistic details with the addition or manip-
ulation of parameters. The effect of this bias is then estimated, mathemati-
cally, for accurate phylogenetic modeling. Thus, the effects of molecular-
level mechanisms (or the breakdown thereof ) are accommodated in models
using ti/tv rate parametric values. In other words, mechanisms, mechanistic
details, or mechanistic explanations are ‘embedded’ in phylogenetic model
parameters, such as the ti/tv rate bias. More importantly, however, models us-
Figure 1. Transitions involve purine–purine or pyrimidine–pyrimidine mutations
(A↔G and C↔T), while transversions involve purine–pyrimidine or pyrimidine–
purine mutations (A↔C, A↔T, G↔C, and G↔T). Color version available as an
online enhancement.
5. It is worth noting that some evidence suggests that this bias in favor of transitions is
not universal. See Keller, Bensasson, and Nichols (2007).
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ing ti/tv parametric values produce tree hypotheses with greater logL values.
Thus, models embedded with mechanisms produce stronger phylogenetic
tree hypotheses.
3. Embedded Phylogenetic Mechanisms. The previous section shows how
models using embedded mechanisms provide stronger phylogenetic tree hy-
potheses. Yet this notion of embedded mechanisms raises important questions.
How are embedded mechanisms distinct from those of interest to the phi-
losophers of mechanism? How does this notion of strengthening phylogeny
estimation by embedding mechanisms bear on the challenge of scope for
the new philosophy of mechanisms? In this section I ﬂesh out this new no-
tion of mechanism and show how it affects the prospective scope of mech-
anistic explanation.
3.1. Understanding Embedded Mechanisms. Above I use the term
‘embedded mechanism’ to capture the fact that the mechanistic details that
facilitate ML phylogeny estimation are entirely implicit; they are built into
mathematical model parameters of DNA substitution (ti/tv bias). While it is
not the goal of this article to construct a complete account of embedded
mechanisms, here I will clarify a few important points. First, I do not mean to
claim that because phylogenetics beneﬁts from embedded mechanisms, it
is a mechanistic science. There is a clear sense in which molecular biology
and neuroscience are mechanistic in that their explanations often elucidate
mechanisms and often use mechanistic strategies of investigation, such as
decomposition, localization, and recomposition. But phylogenetics does not
share these characteristics. Broadly, the new mechanists are interested in the
value and role of mechanisms to scientiﬁc investigation, discovery, model-
ing, and explanation more generally. So the claim is not that phylogenetic
methods or hypotheses are inherently mechanistic—it remains unclear whether
this is the case. Rather, the claim is that mechanistic explanations elsewhere
(molecular biology) positively contribute to phylogenetic tree construction.
It might also be helpful to think about embedded mechanisms in light of
Salmon’s (1984) ontic/epistemic distinction, which highlights a point of con-
tention among new mechanists (Illari 2013). That distinction is meant to
capture the source of explanatory power for those thinking about mecha-
nisms. On the ontic conception of mechanisms, it is the physically embodied
mechanism ‘out there in the world’ that explains.6 On the epistemic con-
ception of mechanisms, however, it is the representation or exhibition of the
mechanism that explains.7With this framework in mind, one should conceive
of an embedded mechanism as a unique kind of epistemic mechanism. While
6. The ontic view is most commonly attributed to Craver (2007).
7. The epistemic view is most commonly attributed to Bechtel (2008).
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it is not precisely clear that embedded mechanisms explain, the above analy-
sis demonstrates a distinct sense in which they strengthen phylogenetic tree
hypotheses. Yet proponents of the epistemic conception of mechanism make
claim to the value of visuo-spatial representations to explanation and under-
standing (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). On that view, it is by virtue of the
fact that visual representations can accommodate parts/entities, causal rela-
tions, and organization that they facilitate scientiﬁc explanation and under-
standing. Yet embedded mechanisms are unique in that they lack precisely
this kind of visual representation. Rather, the embeddedmechanism is—in the
case described above—a mathematical model parameter. Thus, embedded
mechanisms are uniquely epistemic in that they facilitate scientiﬁc under-
standing sans explicit representation.
It may also be useful to think about the notion of embedded mechanisms
in light of Levy’s (2013) tripartite characterization of the philosophy of
mechanisms. He distinguishes three kinds of new mechanism theses, re-
garding the metaphysics of causation (causal mechanism), scientiﬁc expla-
nation (explanatory mechanism), and scientiﬁc methods of investigation
(strategic mechanism):
Causal mechanism (CM) is the view that causal relations, at least outside
the domain of fundamental physical phenomena, exist by virtue of under-
lying mechanisms. CM rivals other accounts of causation, such as regularity
views. It is best seen as a contribution to metaphysics.
Explanatory mechanism (EM) is a thesis about explanatory relevance: it
states that to explain a phenomenon, one must cite mechanistic information,
that is, specify underlying parts and their organization. EM contrasts with other
general accounts of explanation, such as the deductive-nomological model.
Strategicmechanism (SM) concerns the cognitive-epistemic power of mech-
anistic modeling and related scientiﬁc methods. It asserts that certain phenom-
ena are best handled mechanistically. Discussions of SM tend to construe
‘mechanism’ fairly narrowly, in machine-like terms (Levy 2013, 2).
My analysis of embedded mechanisms in phylogenetics is not meant as a
contribution to the metaphysics of causation, nor is it clear that it has im-
plications for such. Hence, CM does not capture the significance of em-
bedded mechanism.
Levy’s characterization of EM represents an interesting candidate for
capturing the notion of embedded mechanism. On the one hand, there is a
sense in which the practice of embedding mechanisms into one’s model
counts as citing mechanistic information. On the other hand, however, it
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remains an open question whether phylogenetic tree construction qualiﬁes
as explanation. While I believe that a case could be made for such a view,
it is beyond the purview of this article. Thus, for present purposes, Levy’s
characterization of EM fails to adequately capture the unique manner in
which embedded mechanisms contribute to ML phylogeny estimation.
Does Levy’s characterization of SM capture my notion that embedded
mechanisms positively inﬂuence phylogenetic tree construction? If one
treats the practice of building mechanistic details into mathematical mod-
els—that is, embedding mechanisms—as a mechanistic method, then SM is
relevant here. However, the practice of embedding mechanisms is mark-
edly unique from exemplar SM methods, such as decomposition, locali-
zation, and recomposition. Thus, the notion of embedding mechanisms in
one’s mathematical model is a good candidate for ﬂeshing out Levy’s char-
acterization of SM.
3.2. On the Challenge of Scope. Earlier I framed this contribution as
one that works to resolve a challenge of scope. Moss (2012) offers the most
explicit presentation of this challenge by questioning the value of the ‘mech-
anistic metaphor’ to some areas in biomedical research, such as intrinsi-
cally unstructured proteins:
By means of what kind of knowing can and should the biomedical sci-
entist and biologist approach the kinds of strikingly nonmachine like em-
pirical realities revealed in studies of the pleiomorphic ensembles and
intrinsically unstructured proteins that constitute the woof and warp of
systematic cellular signaling and adaptive regulation? Is it possible that
where the ‘rods and pistons’ of the mechanistic metaphor have run out of
steam that a transition to alternative forms of understanding will be in or-
der? Where philosophers of mechanism, largely focused on the science of
a bygone era, have yet to recognize this as a problem, it has not escaped
the notice of contemporary biomedical investigators. (Moss 2012, 170)
Although Moss’s concern targets a specialized case, it hints at a more gen-
eral problem for explanandum phenomena that are not amenable to mech-
anistic explanation. Strevens (2008, chap. 2) raises a similar concern, ar-
guing that some phenomena are inherently probabilistic, populational, and,
consequently, unsusceptible to mechanistic explanation. Lastly, Woodward
notes that limits of scope are a feature of all accounts of explanation: “My
view is that mechanistic explanations are most likely to be successful when
the systems to which they are applied satisfy certain empirical presupposi-
tions . . . [yet] as one moves away from contexts in which these presup-
positions are satisﬁed, mechanistic explanation becomes a less promising
strategy. This is not intended as a criticism of mechanistic explanation in
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those circumstances in which it is appropriate, but rather simply reﬂects the
point that, like virtually all explanatory strategies and structures, there are
limits on its range of application” (2013, 64).
The concerns expressed by Moss, Strevens, and Woodward indicate a
limited scope for the new philosophy of mechanisms on the grounds that
there are some explanandum phenomena to which mechanistic thinking or
strategies of investigation are not applicable. How does the notion of an
embedded mechanism bear on this general worry? While it does not an-
swer these concerns directly, it does provide a different way of thinking
about how mechanistic thinking facilitates scientiﬁc investigation and ex-
planation of inherently nonmechanistic phenomena. While Moss, Strevens,
and Woodward may have in mind sciences that make no explicit appeal to
mechanisms or mechanistic information, it remains an open question whether
these sciences implicitly appeal to embedded mechanisms in the manner of
statistical phylogenetics. At the very least, the notion of embedding mecha-
nisms extends the scope of mechanistic thinking beyond those sciences in
which appeal to mechanisms is both explicit and ubiquitous.
4. Conclusion. This article makes a case for the role and value of em-
bedded mechanisms in phylogenetics. At the molecular level, the ti/tv rate
bias is an effect best explained by the mechanistic details of DNA repli-
cation error, recognition, and repair. This mechanistic effect, however, is
of particular value to accurate phylogeny estimation using ML methods.
Models embedded with these mechanistic details produce stronger phylo-
genetic tree hypotheses, as measured by logL values. In other words, im-
plicit ‘embedded’ mechanisms strengthen the science of phylogeny esti-
mation. That embedded mechanisms play a valuable role in phylogenetics
has two important implications for the new philosophy of mechanisms. First,
it suggests a unique and subtle mechanistic strategy characterized by sta-
tistical models bolstered with embedded mechanisms. Embedded mecha-
nisms are unique to those discussed by the philosophers of mechanism in
that they lack explicit, visuo-spatial representation. Second, it helps answer
the important challenge of scope, extending the value and role of mecha-
nisms to the pattern-oriented science of phylogenetics. Extrapolating from
this case to additional sciences using mathematical models of mechanistic
processes is the next step toward a better understanding of the scope and
limits of the new philosophy of mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MECHANISTIC REASONING IN POPULATION GENETICS 
 
5.1 Preface 
 This chapter works to further answer the question: what is the scope of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms? It addresses this question in the context of a second field of 
evolutionary biology that is historically and conceptually treated as nonmechanistic: 
population genetics. I use two frameworks for thinking about mechanistic reasoning to 
show how the modern application of statistical methods is integrated with a family of 
mechanistic methods in evolutionary biology. In building evidence for claims about 
adaptations, evolutionary biologists use statistical methods to build evidence for 
associations between genotypes and phenotypes, which are then bolstered with a family 
of methods driven by mechanistic reasoning.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
 What is a mechanism? Why are mechanisms so pervasive in biological science? 
These sorts of questions set the groundwork for what is often referred to as the new 
philosophy of mechanisms – a philosophical account of scientific reasoning (Craver & 
Tabery, 2015). This chapter advances that project by assessing the scope of mechanistic 
reasoning in a field of biology that is intuitively nonmechanistic: population genetics. 
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The advent of population genetics, through the synthesis of Darwinism and Mendelism, 
roots back to Fisher’s (1918, 1930) application of statistical thermodynamic methods to 
evolutionary theory (Provine, 1971). That synthesis represents a shift from causal-
mechanical reasoning about interactions between organisms and their environments to a 
pattern-oriented and population-perspective, which is inherently mathematical and driven 
by statistics.  
 Here I argue that, while the field of population genetics is indeed nonmechanistic, 
the practical application of population genetic methodologies is integrated with 
mechanistic methodologies. Modern evolutionary biology, that is, strongly informs the 
view that ideal and satisfactory investigations of adaptive evolution call for both 
statistical evidence from population genetic methods as well as mechanistic evidence 
from interventionist manipulations. The philosophical upshot is that, in practice, the 
scope of mechanistic reasoning does not border (i.e., form a boundary), but rather, 
integrates with population genetics. By this I mean that it is not the case that the fruitful 
application of mechanistic methods is excluded from the field of population genetics. 
Rather, it is the case that, in practice, both mechanistic and statistical methods are 
combined in modern efforts to investigate, explain, and build evidence for scientific 
hypotheses regarding adaptive evolution. This result is valuable, first, because it further 
develops our understanding of the role and value of mechanistic reasoning across the 
science and, second, because it bridges the gap between two investigative approaches 





5.3 Population Genetics as a Nonmechanistic Methodology 
 Population genetics is often treated as a field of biology that studies evolution 
using mathematical models and statistical methods at the level of populations (Okasha, 
2012). Classical population genetics is seemingly nonmechanistic. Instead of tracking the 
causal interactions between individual organisms and their environments, population 
genetics was the study of distributions of genes in populations. Classical population 
genetics constructed mathematical models for the purpose of thinking about how, in 
theory, distributions of genes will change in populations in various contexts. An early 
discovery of population genetics, for example, was the Wright-Fisher model-driven 
hypothesis that, in relatively small populations, genetic drift is more likely to sweep a 
population.  
 There is much discussion of population genetics in the context of philosophy of 
science. There is, for example, a dispute about the value of population genetics. On the 
one hand are those who have criticized population genetics for a variety of reasons, such 
as the notion that population genetic models are too idealized and abstract to confer 
legitimate knowledge about real biological evolution (Gildenhuys, 2011; Lewontin, 1980; 
Pigliucci, 2008; Wade, 2005). Others have defended population genetics on a variety of 
points, arguing that – at the very least – population genetic methods are central to 
understanding evolution (Lynch, 2007; Millstein, 2013; Morrison, 2004). It is not the 
goal here to take a stance on this particular issue, although the analysis in Section 5.4 
undoubtedly favors the view that population genetic methods are central to modern 
investigations of adaptive evolution.  
 For the purpose of this analysis, which seeks to understand the relation between 
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population genetic methods and mechanistic methods in modern evolutionary biology, 
population genetics will not be treated as a field of study in biology, but rather, a family 
of statistical and mathematical methods of investigation that consider genes in 
populations, both real and theoretical. For that purpose, the standard application of 
population genetic methods involves the development of mathematical models of 
evolution for a variety of purposes. A key premise of this argument is that, today, 
population genetic methods are most often used to develop statistical evidence regarding 
genotype-phenotype and genotype-fitness associations. That is, the modern application of 
population genetic methods is most often geared toward narrowing down the genome of 
living organisms in search of associations between specific genes correlated with 
adaptive fitness. Section 5.4 treats forward genetics, reverse genetics, and candidate gene 
approaches as modern applications of population genetics.  
 
5.4 Mechanistic Methods and Mechanism 
Elucidation in Compositional Biology 
 As described in the previous section, population genetics represents a challenge 
case for the philosophy of mechanisms. Given the framework of mechanistic explanation 
developed in neuroscience and molecular biology, there is no obvious way in which 
population geneticists appeal to mechanisms and mechanistic information in their 
investigations of the world. So what does one look for in assessing the use of mechanistic 
reasoning to population genetics? To this question, there are two frameworks that quite 
effectively capture mechanistic reasoning in modern evolutionary biology: Tabery’s 




 Both Tabery and Winther describe a division between two approaches or 
theoretical perspectives in behavior genetics and biology respectively. Tabery 
distinguishes the variation-partitioning approach, which seeks to answer ‘how-much’ 
questions about variation in populations by using statistical methodologies to identify and 
measure the causes of variation, and the mechanism-elucidation approach, which seeks 
to answer how questions by using interventionist manipulations in order to reveal 
underlying developmental processes. Winther, on the other hand, distinguishes two 
theoretical perspectives in biology: formal biology, which “relies on mathematical laws 
and models”, and compositional biology, which “investigates the concrete structures, 
mechanisms, and functions through developmental evolution and evolutionary time, of 
material parts and wholes” (p. 472). 
 These two frameworks may be used to effectively capture population genetic and 
mechanistic methods of investigation in modern evolutionary biology. On the one hand, 
population genetic methods are well-captured by Tabery’s variation-partitioning 
approach, as they are often applied to distinguish how much variation in a population is a 
result of various forces of evolution (e.g., drift or selection), and Winther’s account of 
formal biology, as population genetic methods comprise the development and application 
of mathematical models and laws. On the other hand, mechanistic methods in modern 
biology are well-captured by Tabery’s mechanism-elucidation approach, as experimental 
interventionist manipulations play a key role in modern investigations of adaptive 
evolution, and Winther’s account of compositional biology, as these investigations target 
the etiological pathway from genotype, to phenotype, to fitness.  
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5.5 On the Integration of Population Genetic and Mechanistic Methods 
5.5.1 Applications of Population Genetic Methods 
 In modern evolutionary biology, scientists use population genetic methods to 
develop statistical evidence for associations between genotypes, phenotypes, and fitness 
(Okasha, 2012; Pardo-Diaz, Salazar, & Jiggins, 2015). These applications are an 
excellent fit for Tabery’s variation-partitioning approach and Winther’s account of 
formal biology. Broadly, there are two primary applications of modern population genetic 
methods: forward and reverse genetics. Each of these approaches represent a host of 
mathematical models and statistical methods for associating genotypes, phenotypes, and 
fitness. Forward genetics represents the search for genotypes associated with a phenotype 
already believed to be adaptive. This is achieved through Genome Wide Association 
Studies (GWAS), Quantitative Trait Loci (QTL) mapping, and Linkage Disequilibrium 
(LD) studies – all of which involve applications of population genetic, statistical analyses 
and mathematical models (Hunter, Wright, & Bomblies, 2013; Shimizu & Purugganan, 
2005; Stinchcombe & Hoekstra, 2008). Shimizu and Purugganan (2005), for example, 
applied QTL mapping and GWAS techniques to Rockress (Aradibopsis) genomes, a 
weedy coastal plant. Their analyses proceeded from the hypothesis that the quantifiable 
trait, flowering time, was undergoing selection. In this case, application of GWAS and 
QTL mapping provided statistical evidence that the CRY2 gene both underpins flowering 
time and also that it was subject to selection in wild Aradibopsis populations. 
 In other cases, modern evolutionary biologists use reverse genetics to investigate 
a genotype with no prior information or knowledge regarding the adaptive significance of 
said genotype.  Sometimes, however, biologists investigate a genotype without prior 
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knowledge or information regarding its phenotypic or adaptive significance. This practice 
represents a modern application of population genetic methods for the purpose of 
building statistical evidence for specific genotype-phenotype or genotype-fitness 
associations (Balding & Nichols, 2008; Foll & Gaggiotti, 2008; Joost et al., 2007; Luikart 
et al., 2003; Nicholson et al., 2002; Vitalis et al., 2003). 
 The culmination of these efforts is the development of statistical evidence for an 
association between a specific genotype and a specific phenotype that is believed to be 
adaptive. Ideally, practicing biologists seek to employ both forward and reverse genetic 
approaches to the investigation of the same adaptive locus of evolution (Stinchcombe & 
Hoekstra, 2007). Colosimo et al. (2005), for example, used both forward and reverse 
genetics to develop evidence for the relation between Eda alleles and armor plating in the 
threespined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus).  
 
5.5.2 Mechanistic Approaches to Adaptive Evolution 
 While the application of population genetic methods, such as forward and reverse 
genetics, plays a key role in how biologists investigate adaptive evolution, this practice is 
only part of the story. A large part of scientific practice in this respect is building 
evidence for a variety of claims about the relation between a specific genotype, an 
associated phenotype, and adaptive fitness. At the bottom line, the statistical evidence 
produced by population genetic methods is insufficient in presenting a strong case for a 
scientific claim about the adaptive value of a trait and the genotype that underpins it. 
Consequently, in conjunction with population genetic, statistical methods, today 
evolutionary biologists employ a variety of interventionist methods to further bolster 
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claims about adaptive evolution. Evolutionary biologists Pardo-Diaz, Salazar, and 
Jiggens (2015), for example, describe a multistep methodology that integrates both 
population genetics with experimental interventions: 
First, it is necessary to corroborate that a trait affects fitness in the field and is in 
fact adaptive. Then, the region(s) of the genome in which genotypes are correlated 
with adaptive phenotypes should be defined either with classical genetic tools or 
applying new genomic approaches. . . Ultimately, functional experiments are 
required to prove that a gene or mutation is actually responsible for the phenotype 
observed. Once individual genes or SNPs have been identified, it is important to 
quantify their effect in the ‘trait value’ (i.e. how much variation in the phenotype is 
explained by the candidate SNPs/genes). Finally, the genetic variation in the 
genes shaping those adaptive traits should be evaluated in field selection 
experiments in order to establish a definite connection between genotype, 
phenotype and fitness. (pp. 457—458) 
 
The sort of integrative methodology prescribed by Pardo-Diaz, Salazar, and Jiggins fits 
the mold of both Tabery’s account of mechanism-elucidation and variation-partitioning 
approaches as well as Winther’s (2006) distinction between formal biology and 
compositional biology. Pardo-Diaz, Salazar, and Jiggens (2015), for example, claim that 
establishing “the genetic and molecular basis underlying adaptive traits is one of the 
major goals of evolutionary geneticists in order to understand the connection between 
genotype and phenotype and elucidate the mechanisms of evolutionary change” (p. 445; 
emphasis mine). 
 The integration of mechanistic and population genetic methods is borne out by the 
manner in which modern biologists investigate adaptive evolution in living populations. 
Here the focus is the manner in which biologists conduct experimental interventionist 
manipulations of biological systems for the purpose of revealing the development 
processes underlying evolution. There are two primary relationships apt for 
interventionist manipulations. On the one hand, biologists seek to elucidate the 
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mechanism(s) that link a given genotype-phenotype relationship. This is achieved 
through a variety of techniques designed to reveal the molecular function of specific 
genotypes. The experimental development of transgenic organisms represents a key 
interventionist tactic. Here an exogenous gene is inserted into the genome of an embryo 
after which the phenotypic effects are tracked. Rebeiz et al. (2009), for example, 
conducted experimental interventions on the genome of Drosophila melanogaster by 
introducing ebony transgenes light (U62) and dark (U76). In other cases, a candidate gene 
will be removed from the genome of an undeveloped embryo, the phenotypic effects of 
which are then tracked after development. These gene knockouts, too, represent an 
interventionist manipulation for the purpose of investigating and testing the molecular 
function of specific genes. In other cases, instead of the complete removal of a candidate 
gene from an undeveloped embryo, gene expression is reduced in gene knockdown 
experimental interventions. A fourth experimental intervention for the purpose of 
elucidating molecular function involves gene replacement. These experimental 
interventions represent the application of mechanistic methods toward the investigation 
of adaptive evolution via assays of molecular function. 
 In addition to these mechanistic methods applied to genotype-phenotype 
associations, biologists employ similar methods to the investigation of phenotype-fitness 
associations. In order to further develop evidence for hypotheses regarding adaptive 
evolution, that is, biologists conduct ecological experimental interventionist 
manipulations. Most notably, this is achieved through field selection experiments (Barrett 
& Hoekstra, 2011). On this approach, biologists manipulate a variable in a natural 
environment for the purpose of observing fitness effects. This can be achieved through 
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QST—FST comparison studies, which involve an analyses between measurement of 
genetic differentiation within a population (FST ) and analogous genetic variance among 
populations (Leinonen et al., 2013). In other cases, biologists might intervene on a natural 
system in order to determine which physiological mechanisms might contribute to 
adaptive divergence in a population. Lowry et al. (2009), for example, combined QTL 
mapping with reciprocal transplant experiments of the Yellow Monkeyflower plant 
(Mimulus guttatus) to track response to sodium concentration. Still in other cases, 
biologists will intervene on natural systems to investigate phenotype-fitness relations by 
the controlled introduction of organisms into novel environments (Barrett & Schluter, 
2008; Irschick & Reznick, 2009; Kapan, 2001; Reznick et al., 1997). Gompert et al. 
(2014), for example, sought to quantify the relative contributions of selection and genetic 
drift by introducing wingless, stick insects (Timema cristinae) into a novel environment. 
Another experimental manipulation of phenotype-genotype relationships involves the 
introduction of artificial characteristics to natural environments. These assays of 
ecological function allow for the manipulation of evolutionary traits (Irschick & Reznick, 
2009; Linnen et al., 2013; Losos, Warheitt, & Schoener, 1997). Merrill et al. (2012), for 
example, created artificial butterflies (Heliconius), altered wing patterns, introduced them 
to natural environments, and then tracked frequency of attacks from birds.  
It is worth mentioning that extant philosophical perspectives evince a similar 
claim regarding the integration of mechanistic and population genetic methods. Millstein 
(2006) makes a case for natural selection as a population-level causal process. A key 
premise in her argument involves a demonstration that biologists understand natural 
selection as a causal process. In making her case, Millstein describes evolutionary 
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investigations of the montane willow leaf beetle (Chrysomelidae) (Dahlhoff & Rank, 
2000; Rank, 1992; Rank & Dahlhoff, 2002). Her account of Rank and Dahlhoff’s 
investigations of the Phosphoglucose Isomerase (PGI) locus further evince the view that, 
in modern biology, satisfactory evidence of hypotheses regarding adaptive evolution 
involve the integration of both population genetic, statistical methods as well as 
mechanistic methods: 
We need either to perform a laboratory experiment to demonstrate that the 
selective agent indeed acts on the phenotype in the way we think it does, or 
we need to provide the underlying mechanism to show that the genotypes 
have the abilities that we say that they do, or both. Rank and Dahlhoff do 
both; the laboratory experiment is described above, and they explain that 
the different PGI genotypes’ differing abilities to withstand heat and cold 
are the result of the production of differing amounts of heat shock protein at 
different temperatures. This causal and mechanistic information, together 
with the other information presented, provides strong evidence for Rank 
and Dahlhoff’s conclusions. (p. 640) 
 
The picture that emerges is one of mechanism-elucidation approaches in modern 
compositional biology. The manner in which biologists intervene on genotype-phenotype 
relationships represents mechanistic methodologies via assays of molecular function, 
such as gene knockouts, gene knockdowns, transgenics, and gene replacements. The 
manner in which biologists intervene on phenotype-fitness relationships represents the 




This chapter is about the scope of the new philosophy of mechanisms. In most 
cases, the value of mechanistic reasoning is well represented in those process-oriented 
fields of scientific investigation that target biological systems composed of interacting 
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and organized parts. Fields of evolutionary biology that focus on patterns, primarily use 
mathematical models and statistical methods, and make no explicit appeal to mechanisms 
or mechanistic information, then, present a challenge case for the scope of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms across the sciences. Here I argue that in modern evolutionary 
biology, population genetic methods are most fruitfully applied in tandem with 
mechanistic methods in building evidence for hypotheses regarding adaptive evolution.  
I characterize population genetics using Tabery’s (2014) conception of the 
variation-partitioning approach and Winther’s (2006) account of formal biology. I 
characterize mechanistic methods using Tabery’s conception of mechanism-elucidation 
and Winther’s account of compositional biology. The view that emerges is one of an 
integration of mechanistic and population genetic methods of investigating adaptive 
evolution in living populations. On the one hand, biologists use mathematical models and 
statistical methods to develop genotype-phenotype and genotype-fitness associations. On 
the other hand, however, evolutionary investigations do not cease with these modern 
applications of population genetics. Rather, they proceed from statistical evidence to 
causal-mechanical evidence. In order to make a strong case for a scientific hypothesis 
regarding adaptive evolution in living populations, statistical associations must be tested 
and bolstered using mechanistic methods, such as experimental interventionist 
manipulations. Thus, while the scope of the new mechanistic philosophy may not extend 
directly into population genetics as a field of biology, both mechanistic and population 
genetic methods are integrated in the practice of building evidence for hypotheses about 
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 What is good scientific reasoning? This dissertation addresses two questions 
related to the most prominent and promising recent effort to answer this question: the 
new philosophy of mechanisms. First, what is the new philosophy of mechanisms? 
Second, what is its scope? I have argued in answer to the first question that the new 
philosophy of mechanisms is a rather wide array of philosophical projects all driven by 
the value and importance placed on mechanistic reasoning to understanding the natural 
world. I have argued in answer to the second question that the scope of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms extends to integrate with statistical approaches applied in 
modern evolutionary biology. 
 I have made my case in the following ways. In Chapter 2, I set the groundwork 
for the project by reviewing six models of explanation that precede the new philosophy of 
mechanisms: the Deductive Nomological Model, the Deductive Statistical Model, the 
Inductive Statistical Model, the Unification Model, the Statistical Relevance Model, and 
the Causal-Mechanical Model. By highlight the shortcomings of these six models, I 
introduced the new philosophy of mechanisms as a sundry set of efforts to develop a new 
account of explanation that better captures scientific practice.  
 In Chapter 3, I made my case for mechanistic reasoning as the glue that binds the 
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philosophy of mechanisms. There I elucidated the key tenets and projects of the new 
philosophy of mechanisms in light of the debate about whether or not natural selection is 
a mechanism. In Chapters 4 and 5, I make a case for my answer to the question of scope. 
I argue, first, that that mechanistic reasoning positively influences statistical 
phylogenetics via the practice of embedding mechanisms in mathematical models of tree 
hypothesis construction. This warrants the conclusion that, in statistical phylogenetics, 
mechanistic reasoning positively influences a modern evolutionary biological science that 
is often understood as inherently nonmechanistic. I argue, second, that mechanistic 
reasoning positively influences modern population genetics, another modern evolutionary 
science often treated as inherently nonmechanistic.  
 The upshot of the project as a whole is a better picture of the latest philosophical 
understanding of scientific reasoning, as well as it scope and limits. While new 
mechanists defend a variety of different theses, are motivated by a variety of different 
case studies, and tackle different philosophical challenges, they are all unified by the 
importance of mechanistic reasoning to understanding the natural world. With respect to 
its scope, I have gone straight to the most difficult cases: the deeply mathematical and 
statistical sciences that are seemingly nonmechanistic. The results are promising. Even in 
those places of scientific investigation where mechanisms and mechanistic information 
are not explicitly mentioned or represented, mechanistic reasoning is positively 
influential. In some cases, mechanistic reasoning plays an important role in the 
construction of mathematical models characteristic of statistical reasoning. In other cases, 
mechanistic reasoning drives the investigate practices toward the search for and 
discovery of evidence underpinning evolutionary adaptations.  
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 The results of these arguments indicate directions for future work. On the 
question of scope, there is still much to be addressed for the new philosophy of 
mechanisms. Although I have a made a case for the role and value of mechanistic 
reasoning in two fields of modern evolutionary biology – statistical phylogenetics and 
population genetics – there has not yet been an assessment of mechanistic reasoning in 
developmental biology. Moreover, the notion that statistical phylogeneticists make use of 
embedded mechanisms introduces a broader question regarding the role and value of 
embedded mechanisms across the sciences. Presumably, wherever scientists are 
developing mathematical models that accommodate physical mechanistic information, 
there may be a presence of embedded mechanisms. An identification of additional cases 
and kinds of embedded mechanisms across the sciences is a future project that I believe is 
well-motivated by what has been achieved above.  
 Although I have tried to identify the core of the new philosophy of mechanisms as 
an emphasis on the value of mechanistic reasoning, a thorough philosophical analysis of 
the nature of mechanistic reasoning is left wanting. Moreover, implicit in these arguments 
is the view that statistical reasoning is the contrast of mechanistic reasoning. A thorough 
distinction between these two kinds of reasoning in the sciences as well as an assessment 
of the existence of different kinds of scientific reasoning is another future project 
motivated by this dissertation.  
 While I have introduced the challenge of application in Chapter 3 as a subsidiary 
problem for new mechanists interested in closing the gap between how philosophers and 
scientists think and talk about mechanisms, this challenge only hints at a broader set of 
normative components related to the new philosophy of mechanisms. One of the things 
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that really distinguishes the mechanistic account of scientific explanation from previous 
accounts is special attention to the activities of practicing scientists. In this light, there are 
additional questions regarding how the new mechanistic philosophy might work as a 
model for positively influencing scientific practice.  
